CSW presents evidence for alleged use of chemical weapons against Karenni people of Burma 21/04/2005

EVIDENCE FOR ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST KARENNI PEOPLE OF BURMA Strong evidence has emerged of the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Burma Army against the Karenni people. A draft report from CSW International President Dr Martin Panter presents evidence of chemical weapons use during an incident which is alleged to have happened near Burma’s north western border with Thailand on February 15. During the shelling of a Karenni camp, Dr Panter has gathered reports that a device exploded which gave out yellow smoke and a “highly irritating odour”. On April 14 Dr Panter interviewed five of the soldiers who suffered symptoms as a result of this alleged attack, such as irritation to the skin and lungs and severe muscle weakness. The relevant part of Dr Panter’s draft report follows below, as does the full text of his draft report. Mervyn Thomas, Chief Executive of Christian Solidarity Worldwide UK, said: “The circumstantial evidence for the use of chemical weapons against the Karenni people seems to be very compelling indeed. The evidence Dr Panter gathered of irritation to people’s eyes, throat, lungs and skin point to the use of chemical weapons against them. The Burmese regime has been waging a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Karenni for many years now, and the apparent use of chemical weapons is consistent with what we know of this brutal regime. CSW calls on the international community to put increased pressure on this regime to improve its human rights record. In addition we are calling on ASEAN to refuse to allow Burma to chair ASEAN in July 2006.” 14 April 2005 The issue of Chemical weapons use by the Military Junta. Allegations had been made that on February 15 at a Karenni border post known as Nya My, some 10km west of the Thai hill town of Mae Hong Son following a prolonged period of heavy artillery shelling starting on January 14, a heavy artillery device exploded in the camp quite different to those previously experienced by the Karenni Army. Usually, we were informed by the soldiers present at the camp at the time, the shells exploded and they had black, white or grey smoke, there was a typical odour or colour, with which they were all familiar, and had been for many years. On this particular day February 15, a device exploded with a very distinctive yellow smoke and totally different pungent and immediately a highly irritating odour. Within minutes those soldiers near enough to inhale vapours from this device became extremely distressed with irritation to the eyes, throat, lungs and skin. Subsequently some developed severe muscle weakness and one coughed up blood . all lost weight between 5-10kg over the ensuing 4weeks. We interviewed 5 of the soldiers aged between 35-42, all of whom had fought with Karenni resistance forces for between 15-25 years, on 14 April 2005 at a location just inside the Thai border. We took a detailed history and conducted clinical examinations, using as outlined inn the definitive Jones Chem-Bio Handbook for military use, second edition published in 2002 (of which the author has a copy). This matrix is a highly detailed questionnaire and gives a detailed evidential basis for the use of different chemical agents whether nerve agents, blister agents, cyanide, pulmonary agents or riot control agents. Using this agent indicator matrix and conducting clinical examinations of five of the soldiers who were effected by this explosive device, additionally using evidence from another doctor – who examined the patients of 21 February 2005, strong circumstantial evidence exists for the use of chemicals, particularly nerve agents, pulmonary agents and possibly blister agents. The detailed questionnaire, and the other doctor’s detailed clinical report, are available for examination by contacting the author but they are too detailed and lenghtly to included in this report. For more information, please contact Richard Chilvers, Communications Manager, CSW on 020 8329 0045 or email Richard.chilvers@csw.org.uk NOTES TO EDITORS: THE DRAFT REPORT IN FULL Draft Report of CSW Visit to Thai-Burmese Border Area April 9 – 15 2005 1. Personnel Dr Martin Panter, CSW Australia Mr Robert Colefax, Engineer, Board Member CSW Australia Mr Mike Bevan, CSW UK Mrs Phil Bevan, CSW UK 2. Purposes a) To look into the effects of the new Thai law requiring Burmese refugees living in Thailand to move to border refugee camps by March 31, 2005. b) To investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the military junta in Burma against Karenni forces in February 2005. c) To assess and evaluate CSW supported projects in the region. d) To assess the likely environmental and social effects of a dam construction in the upper Salween River to be known as the Weh Gyi Dam. 3. Overview At present the only refugees/displaced people in Thailand to be effected by the new laws are the so called ‘POCs’ or People of Concern, who have already applied for repatriation in a third country. About 1200 people come within this category in Thailand, and have already – by March 31 – been moved to border refugee camps. Those in central and northern Thailand to No Po camp in the Umphang district, and those in the south to a holding camp in the Songlaburi district. It has been suggested that pro-democracy and Burmese resistance groups are likely to be the next targeted, but no timetable for this has been suggested. The proposed upper Salween Weh Gyi Dam, if built will cause untold suffering to tens of thousands of Karenni citizens living in the area to be inundated, displacing 25% of the population and flooding 35% of Karenni territory, turning much of it into a huge inland sea. The circumstantial evidence for an attack on Karenni soldiers at a camp about 10km west of Mae Hong Son on February 15 2005, using a chemical weapon, is compelling. As direct evidence for such an attack requires isolation and identification of the chemicals used, along with photographic evidence that is both location and date specific and certified (the minimum requirements by the UN to prove their use), it is – in the circumstances in which rogue regimes use such weapons, almost impossible to obtain. Such is the case here, However, we believe the evidence presented to us to be of sufficient gravity to be placed on the record in this report. -- 1-- 4. Key Personnel met within Thailand Father Gregory, Catholic Priest, True life in God mission (April 11) Pastor Winai, Childrens orphanage Ban Huai Bong, Maesot (April 11-12) Saw Min Lwin, Director FTUB (Free Trade Union of Burma) (April 11) Ps Dr Saw Simon Maela, Refugee camp, Director Karen Baptist Bible School (April 12) v Saw Po Bond, Chairman Maela refugee camp (April 12) Saw Ner Clay, Director No Bo Bible School (April 12) Ps Jolly, Director No Bo Bible School (April 12) Saw Robert Htwe, Chairman KRC – Karen Relief Committee (April 12) Saw Htoo Htoo Lay, First Secretary KNU – Karen National Union (April 13) Saw Khaing Oo Maung, Head Teacher BMSOH School Maesot (April 13) General Aung Than Lay, Karenni Prime Minister (April 13) Saw Doh Say Bani, Karenni Foreign Office spokesperson (April 13-14) UNHCR Mae Hong Son (April 14) KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) soldiers involved in alleged chemical attack on February 15, 2005 (April 14) 5. Meetings of Significance April 11 Meeting with Saw Min Lwin, Director of the FTUB, (Federation of Trade Unions in Burma.) 6 staff and 7 interns working with Min Lwin. The FTUB advocates for the 2 million or so migrant Burmese workers in Thailand. They work through Thai registered NGO’s and the law society of Thailand. In the Maesot area alone there are over 50 factories employing migrant workers, mostly garment or footwear manufacturers. The factories each employ between 500 and 1000 workers. As we conducted our meeting, the hum of sewing machines could be heard in an adjoining factory, next to the FTUB offices. Since 2001, about 95% of migrant workers have been legally registered. Multinational companies, such as Nike, Camel, Gap, Sears Roebuck, Khol and LLB all have factories manufacturing their goods in the Maesot area. Workers are paid about half the minimum Thai wage of TB125 per day, or about TB 60 per day, equivalent to about 1 pound sterling or A$2.50. They get this wage for a 9 hour day or a 67 hour week, with often compulsory overtime in addition paid at the rate of TB8 per hour. -- 2 -- The registration fees for a migrant worker are TB3800 per annum, equivalent to about 2 months work. Often their employers will pay up to half the registration fee. The minimum age for factory workers is 15 years, but this is poorly policed, and many children younger than this reportedly work in factories. The FTUB are working with issues of child labour in conjunction with the ILO – the International Labour Organisation. Most migrant workers come to Thailand because of the conditions in their own country, especially the widespread practice of forced labout. There are major concerns with health care and access to treatment, especially for work related incidents which are common. Migrant workers are not entitled to any compensation. Meeting with Saw Htoo Htoo Lay, First Secretary KNU, Senior negotiator for the KNU at the peace talks in 2004-2005 with SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). We discussed the new laws requiring Burmese citizens living in Thailand to be registered, and confined within border refugee camps by March 31, 2005. Htoo Htoo Lay informed us that up to this point the only target group has been the so called POC’s or People of Concern, that have already made application for repatriation in a third country, ie after Burma and Thailand, and who will await a decision on their future in a refugee camp. He claimed that Thailand would then progressively target the various dissident groups and eventually all the Burmese resistance movements in Thailand, however no timetable for that has yet been announced. With regard to cease fire negotiations with Junta, he discussed fully and comprehensively, developments in the last 15 months. Negotiations commenced in January 2004, There were 2 Burmese groups involved. The first group headed by Khin Nyent, the Director of Military Intelligence and the second group directed jointly by Tan Swhe, the Senior minister and Maung Aye deputy senior minister of the military junta Khin Nyunt. To this point in time there have been four rounds of negotiation. The first in January 2004 in Rangoon, the second in February 2004 in Moulmein, the third in October 2004 in Rangoon, and then last a brief 4 hour session in Moulmien on March 13, 2005. In the initial (January 2005) talks, it was agreed to establish (in principle) a cease fire between the SPPC and the KNU. Also to meet each month to establish “a more meaningful” ceasefire. (Presumably as the initial cease fire talks had no meaning?) Under the instructions the Karen President General Byo Mya, who was also present at these initial talks, a written agreement would be drafted and signed by both parties. Byo Mya then met personally with Khin Nyunt to vv ..3.. establish the principles of such an agreement. Htoo Htoo Lay as Chief Negotiator and trained lawyer was present at that meeting. Khin Nyunt asked Byo Mya what kind of agreement he wanted. Byo Mya replied he wanted – initially at least an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding). This was rejected and instead proposed an agreement of “Minutes of the Meeting”. These minutes were to have the following points: 1. Agreement in Principle to a ceasefire 2. Strengthen ceasefire by meeting monthly thereafter 3. Agreement to handle the problems of the IDP’s (Internally Displaced Peoples) and refugees (it was not discussed how these problems were to be handled). 4. If a conflict arose in the future, it was to be resolved by peaceful means, rather than military one. These minutes were signed by Khin Nyunt and Byo Mya and submitted to the other group Tan Shwe and Mauna Aye for their approval. They were promptly rejected. Khin Nyunt was ‘purged in October 2004 and remains under house arrest, along with many in UZ military intelligence. On March 13 2005 a meeting was held in Moulmein between Htoo Htoo Lay and other KNU representatives and representatives of the Junta Thu Ra, and Major General Muint Aung, the Juntas SE Military Commander. They had clear instructions from Rangoon as to what to say. 1. The talks and any agreement made previously were declared null and void, as they had been handled by a different group. 2. This was not a ‘negotiating process’, it was only a meeting. 3. They informed the KNU they at 3 locations only, decided by Rangoon. In these locations (not specified), they would be provided with rice, cooking oil, salt and pork for free. Furthermore they were to follow all instructions and directions from Rangoon. When Htoo Htoo Lay mentioned the continued human rights abuses by the SPDC military junta he was promptly informed that the SPPC did not commit any human rights abuses. Furthermore, they informed the KNU delegation that the SPPC would ‘be everwhere and would clear any places within their borders where there was opposition to the rule of the Junta in Rangoon, and would conquer all parts of the country, suppressing any opposition in my place and at anytime inorder to bring peace in Burma. The meeting lasted precisely 4 hours. There are presently no plans for future meetings. They were also informed at the 13 March 2005 meeting that the Junta were planning to establish a new ‘draft construction’ by the end of 2005. This will be followed by a referendum to ratify the constitution. They will however not permit any international observers to be present or to oversee ..4.. the referendum as they would be ‘interfering in Burma’s internal affairs, and would undoubtedly spread anti-Burmese rhetoric, discrediting Burmas election process!’. April 12 2005 Meeting with General Aung Than Lay, Karenni Prime Minister. The General informed us that the deliberate and the planned destruction of his people was continuing. He said that virtually the entire Karenni civilian population are living in a police state, tens of thousands being uprooted from their homes, villages and communities and are living in internment camps or forced to live as IDP’s in the forests and jungles along the border areas with Thailand. One of the most insidious recent developments is a plan, now fully developed to dam the upper Salween River in a project known as the Ghi Dam, which would inundate 35% of Karenni territory, flooding an area over 100km long and upto 50km wide, displacing (or killing) 25% of the Karenni population. No independent environmental impact study has been conducted into the effects of this giant inland sea in an area containing many rare and endangered animals and plants. Japanese engineers have designed the project. Funding will be from the world bank and Thailand will buy most of the hydro-electric power generated from the dams construction and Burma plans to resolve once and for all the ‘Karenni question’ NB (Awful and haunting echoes of the Holocaust). “Please help us before it it too late”, was General Aung Than Lay’s plaintiff and moving plea. 14 April 2005 The issue of Chemical weapons use by the Military Junta. Allegations had been made that on February 15 at a Karenni border post known as Nya My, some 10km west of the Thai hill town of Mae Hong Son following a prolonged period of heavy artillery shelling starting on January 14, a heavy artillery device exploded in the camp quite different to those previously experienced by the Karenni Army. Usually, we were informed by the soldiers present at the camp at the time, the shells exploded and they had black, white or grey smoke, there was a typical odour or colour, with which they were all familiar, and had been for many years. On this particular day February 15, a device exploded with a very distinctive yellow smoke and totally different pungent and immediately a highly irritating odour. Within minutes those soldiers near enough to inhale vapours from this device became extremely distressed with irritation to the eyes, throat, lungs and skin. Subsequently some developed severe muscle weakness and one coughed up blood . all lost weight between 5-10kg over the ensuing 4weeks. We interviewed 5 of the soldiers aged between 35-42, all of whom had fought with Karenni resistance forces for between 15-25 years, on 14 April 2005 at a location ..5.. ..6.. just inside the Thai border. We took a detailed history and conducted clinical examinations, using as outlined inn the definitive Jones Chem-Bio Handbook for military use, second edition published in 2002 (of which the author has a copy). This matrix is a highly detailed questionnaire and gives a detailed evidential basis for the use of different chemical agents whether nerve agents, blister agents, cyanide, pulmonary agents or riot control agents. Using this agent indicator matrix and conducting clinical examinations of five of the soldiers who were effected by this explosive device, additionally using evidence from another doctor – who examined the patients of 21 February 2005, strong circumstantial evidence exists for the use of chemicals, particularly nerve agents, pulmonary agents and possibly blister agents. The detailed questionnaire, and the other doctor’s detailed clinical report, are available for examination by contacting the author but they are too detailed and lenghtly to included in this report. 12 April 2005 Visit to a camp over the border in Burma. Since our last visit in November 2004, the situation has remained unchanged. Burmese troops destroyed a clinic in the next settlement 3km south in mid March but this particular camp has remained free of attack. It is however protected by a ring of KNU troops. Basic food rations are provided by an International NGO but this is likely to cease as of October 31 2005. Some limited cultivation of crops has been possible. The numbers in the camp have remained static as there is only just enough rice to go around and further influx would jeopardise this. One family of five – parents and children had arrived a few days prior to our visit, having left their 2 youngest children 9 & 11 years with relatives in their village 3 days walk away. They had been told they could only stay if they found support for their food. On the day of our visit they were away at another refugee camp in Thailand with 2 of their children, seeking help from their relatives. We interviewed their 15 year old son about why they had left their village. He told us that food was very scarce. As Christians they were constantly being harassed and were not able to worship freely and they were frightened of the Burmese army. He was naturally very reticent of revealing much detailed information, especially as his younger brother and sister were still in his village. We gave funds to him and his family for rice for 6 months. 6. Discussion The use of chemical weapons is banned both by the Geneva Convention and United Nations Conventions of Warfare. A dilemma facing any investigation into the use of chemical weapons is the ..7.. very high burden of proof required by the international community before handing down sanctions on any nation accused of their use. This involves detailed photographic documentation which is both date and location specific, authorised laboratory findings and a continuous and traceable trail from the alleged site where the device was used/located to the authorised laboratory investigating chemical traces found. Because many of the agents used are volatile, few have traces of chemicals left for more than a few days, many are soluble in water. Thus brief rainstorm can wash away all traces, this combined with the fact that such devices are used in conjunction with standard heavy artillery shells makes the burden of proof well nigh impossible. Rogue nations that are likely to use such weapons are well aware of these facts and skilled in their use, so as to cover their tracks. Thus all we can definitely state in this case is that all the findings ane consistent with the use of chemical weapons by the Junta on February 15 2005 and that the circumstantial evidence for their is compelling. The stated position of the military rulers of the Junta to Saw Htoo Htoo Lay in Moulmein on March 13 make it clear there is to be no softening of the hard line policies that have existed in Burma, at least since the democratic uprising of 1988 and the election of 1990 giving a overwhelming victory for the NLD Party and its head Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Following these surprise results, the military Junta completely disregard the democratic will of the people and seized power amd arrested the elected leader who continues to languish under house arrest in Rangoon. At the meeting of ASEAN at Mactan in the Phillipines the week between April 11-13 2005, Burma rejected calls to voluntarily give up the rotating ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006 because of its poor democracy and human rights record. Foreign Minister Nyan Win said that the UN and US could not force his country to refuse of Chairmanship “That is their attitude, not ours”, he stated, “We can decide for ourselves, we are an independent country”,( Bangkok Post, April 11 2005.) However with a record of human rights abuses which ranks as one of the worst in the world, evidence of planned massive environmental destruction and social dislocation from the Weh Gyi Dam, forced labour, genocidal policies against it ethnic minorities and now strong circumstantial evidence of the use of chemical weapons against its own people, it is high time the International community and in particular the UN take strong decisive and robust measures against this illegal regime,which claims “de juve” recognition. 7. Recommendations to the International Community 1. In view of the circumstantial evidence of the use of chemical weapons by the military Junta is Burma, which comes on top of a prolonged and overwhelming body of evidence of the severest forms of human rights abuses throughout Burma, but especially that meted out to its ethnic minorities, that Western governments, particularly those in Australia/New Zealand, America and the EU refuse any cooperation with ASEAN if Burma refuses to relinquish it claim to the Chairmanship of ASEAN in July 2006. 2. That the International Community brings pressure to bear of the SPDC Ruling Junta in Rangoon, the world bank and on the Japanese and Thai Governments for support, either directly or indirectly in the building of the Weh Gui Dam in the upper Salween River. No independent environmental impact study has been conducted. This area is home to countless rare and endangered flora and fauna, quite apart from approximately 70,000 (25%) of the Karenni population. The dam construction is above all else an indirect for of a continuing policy of ethnic cleansing of the Karenni nation, almost all of whom now live in fear under a military dictatorship that boasts it is seeking to promote peace and development throughout the country. If lies are to be believed, this would have to rank as one of the greatest lies ever told. 3. That the Thai Government be encouraged to allow law abiding pro-democracy Burmese groups to remain in Thailand where they can continue to be voice to the world for the millions of their fellow citizens who continue to be oppressed and denied their basic and fundamental human rights in Burma. 4. That the 1.2million migrant workers from Burma who work in Thailand are awarded the basic minimum wage of TB125 per day and are not exploited and underpaid by employers and western multinationals. Simply because they deem them to be disempowered weak and lacking the ability to respond to such practices. 5. That the SPPC cease the ridiculour charade of holding so called ‘cease fire talks’, and informing the international community that ‘17’ ethnic groups have signed agreements with the Junta. The only groups holding out being the KNU (Karen National Union), the SSA (the Shan State Army) and the KNPP (Karenni National Peoples Party) Signed Agreements, have over the years proven meaningless and have seldom been honoured by the Junta for more than days or of most weeks. Any member of the the ruling Junta who showed a human face – such as the former head of Military Intelligence Khin Nyunt – was “purged” in October 2004 and remains under house arrest; Many members of his Military Intelligence Organisation have recently received prison sentences ranging from 10 years to life in the infamous Insein Goal in Rangoon. Their stated 9th (March 2005) is to suppress and control any opposition of any kind anywhere and anytime if access within their borders. The International Community needs to act on behalf of the millions of peace loving and gentle peoples of Burma before it is too late. Dr. Martin Panter, International President CSW, Chaing Mai, Thailand. 16/04/2005