Indonesia\u2019s presidential election is imminent; on 14 February President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, will step down after two terms in office and the world\u2019s third-largest democracy and largest Muslim-majority nation will head to the polls to elect their next leader. National and local parliamentary representatives and senators will also be voted on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The election carries with it significant implications for human rights including freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). How have religious minorities fared under Widodo\u2019s presidency and what must be addressed by the incoming president to improve the FoRB for all in the country?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Jokowi is a popular figure in Indonesia, with 97% of non-Muslims<\/a> voting for him in the 2019 elections, but his election promises of addressing past human rights abuses, inequalities and bolstering rights protections remained largely unrealised. Under Jokowi\u2019s presidency, discriminatory practices and violent assaults on ethnic and religious minorities have persisted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n From the start of his latest term in office Jokowi came under criticism for his identity politics which utilised religion for political gain. Selecting Ma\u2019ruf Amin as his vice-presidential running mate in the 2019 presidential race raised concerns. Amin is a powerful Muslim cleric who has ardently supported fatwas (Islamic non-binding legal rulings) against religious minority rights and thereby helped stir up religious hatred, violence and discriminatory decrees against those minorities.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Amin was instrumental in the conviction and subsequent two-year imprisonment<\/a> of then-Jakarta Governor, ethnic Chinese Christian Basuki \u2018Ahok\u2019 Purnama for violating blasphemy laws in 2018. He gave evidence to the court against Ahok, who had been accused of insulting Islam through misrepresented comments he made in his campaign for re-election. Some of these protests erupted into violence with calls to kill Ahok.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By teaming up with Amin despite representing the more liberal, religiously pluralist position in the 2019 election through the backing of a coalition led by the non-religious party PDIP, Jokowi was said to be instrumentalising religion as a political tool to win votes. He was thought to be trying to remain relevant to pro-Islamic interests whilst being firmly positioned in the religiously pluralist camp.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A most concerning facet of Jokowi\u2019s presidency has been the expansion of the country\u2019s already oppressive blasphemy laws, which have been enshrined in Indonesian law since 1965. Over the years these laws have largely been used to prosecute those from religious minorities and those who are said to have criticised Islam. A new criminal code passed in December 2022 has broadened these blasphemy laws from one to six articles and criminalises leaving a religion or belief as apostasy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Changes to the law also include the government recognising \u2018any living law\u2019, which in practice is likely to formally legalise the provincial implementation and regulation of sharia law which will compound oppression of religious minorities and could continue to weaponize the \u2018protection\u2019 of religion as a political tool. Pending approval of implementing regulations, the new law will be effective from 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In September 2023 an Indonesian woman, Lina Lutfiawati, was sentenced<\/a>to two years imprisonment for posting a video to TikTok in which she recited an Islamic prayer before consuming pork. Lutfiawati was said to have \u2018spread information that was intended to incite hate or individual\/group enmity based on religion\u2019. In addition to her jail sentence, she received a fine of 250 million rupiah (around \u00a313,000).<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are 34.2 million Christians in Indonesia, but they make up only around 10-12% of the population. Christians face obstacles to practising their faith in several ways including through intimidation, violence and the obstruction of building places of worship from local communities and authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The joint ministerial decree of 2006 requires registered religious groups to gain formal approval to build new houses of worship through the collecting of signatures from those who will worship in the new construction (minimum 90 signatures) and signatures from members of the wider community (minimum 60 signatures) alongside recommendations from local officials. This frequently causes obstructions for minority religious communities when they seek approval to build in areas predominantly inhabited by those of another faith.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the largest religious minority in Indonesia, Christians have been significantly impacted by this law. The Diplomat<\/a> reports that since the enactment of this regulation, more than 2,000 churches have been forced to close. One of Jokowi\u2019s election promises in his 2014 campaign was to do away with this regulation, but the promise was never kept.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In 2022, plans to build a church on land belonging to Batak Protestant Christian Church in Cilegon, Banten, were halted<\/a>by regional officials despite the fact the church had gathered far more than the minimum required signatures from those within their faith and from the local community to proceed. Despite having a Christian population of around 7,000, including over 1,000 Catholics, there are no churches in Cilegon and Christians have to drive 45 minutes to reach the nearest church.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Ahmadiyya Muslim community has existed in Indonesia since 1925 and claims a population of approximately 500,000 across 330 branches throughout the country. The Ahmadiyya consider themselves to be Muslims but are regarded as heretics by the majority Sunni Muslim population and therefore fall outside of the six officially recognised religions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 2005, the community has experienced serious violations of FoRB, including incidents of violence. In addition, a Joint Ministerial Decree introduced in 2008 by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister of Home Affairs prohibited promulgation of Ahmadiyya teachings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2013 the governor of West Java said that there would be no violence against the Ahmadiyya community if there were no Ahmadiyya teachings or practices, describing Ahmadiyya Islam as \u2018a deviant belief.\u2019 The \u2018problem,\u2019 he added, \u2018will disappear if the belief disappears.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although Ahmadis were able to build six new mosques<\/a> in 2022, intimidation of the community persists, and their activities continue to be restricted. According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) there is a \u2018proliferation of municipal and regency-level laws to \u2018protect\u2019 public morality against [so-called] deviant forms of Islam and\/or behaviour has created a legal infrastructure that curbs freedom of expression for minority faith communities, especially unrecognised communities such as Ahmadiyya Muslims.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, on 14 January 2022, UCA News reported<\/a> that a district chief in Indonesia\u2019s West Kalimantan province ordered the demolition of an Ahmadi mosque that had been damaged in a September 2021 attack by Muslim extremists. The order was issued days after the perpetrators of the attack were jailed for just four months. September 2021 attack by Muslim extremists. The order was issued days after the perpetrators of the attack were jailed for just four months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It appears that any serious commitment to the improvement of FoRB in Indonesia has been lacking under Jokowi\u2019s terms in office. This is despite the president making public statements<\/a> in 2023 acknowledging gross human rights violations in Indonesia\u2019s past and pledging to ensure they \u2018never happen again in the future\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The current favourite<\/a> to succeed to the presidency is Prabowo Subianto. It is widely assumed Jokowi is privately backing Subianto whose running mate in the presidential polls is Jokowi\u2019s son. Some commentators have labelled<\/a>this \u2018dynastic politics\u2019 with Jokowi engaging in nepotism through the controversial changes to constitutional law<\/a> made in order to accept his 36-year-old son into the race.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Subianto has sought to portray himself as committed to religious pluralism in his public commentary, despite previously being considered particularly pro-Islam in his failed 2019 presidential bid.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In January 2024 Subianto addressed the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Indonesian: Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, PGI) \u2013 the largest organisation of churches in Indonesia. In his speech<\/a>he emphasised the diversity of religion within his own extended family \u2013 \u2018we all live harmoniously. Even if we fought, it was never because of religion\u2019. Subianto also spoke of his time in the military and how it brings together recruits from different religious backgrounds \u2013 \u2018brothers in arms\u2019 with minority groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Subianto\u2019s backing coalition includes parties that may oppose reforming laws on religion, potentially posing challenges to implementing changes related to FoRB. It is important to note that he has a history of being supported by radical Islamic groups in previous elections, which has raised concerns among some religious minorities about his true stance on religious freedoms, and Subianto himself has a chequered past where human rights are concerned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indonesians under the age of 40 form the largest proportion of eligible voters in this 2024 election. Social media holds sway over these voters in particular, a fact not lost on Subianto\u2019s team who seek to portray him as what The Guardian has termed<\/a> \u2018a cute grandpa with awkward dance moves and a softer side\u2019 on Tik Tok and Instagram.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such an image is a far cry from the former special forces soldier involved in human rights abuses. In 1998, Subianto was accused of involvement in the kidnapping and torture of pro-democracy activists. He never faced charges and has always denied any wrongdoing but this, along with being implicated in massacres in East Timor in the 1980s and further abuses in Papua, paints a very different picture of the military man Subianto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Blasphemy laws<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The plight of Christians<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n
The Ahmadiyya community<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Indonesia\u2019s future prospects<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n
Subianto\u2019s human rights record<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n