Until 3 January 2026, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro sat as the head of\u00a0the\u00a0Venezuelan government. He\u00a0derived much, if not all, of his legitimacy because he\u00a0was\u00a0handpicked\u00a0as successor\u00a0by the late president, Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, with the approval of\u00a0the then leader of Cuba,\u00a0Ra\u00fal Castro. This superseded the normal chain of succession, under which Diosdado Cabello, as head of the National Assembly, should have assumed the presidency until elections could be held.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the time, speculation was rampant about possible divisions within Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s inner circle, and the possibility that Cabello might make a power grab of his own. However, Cabello, and other powerful Ch\u00e1vez loyalists, including General Vladimir Padrino, publicly accepted Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s choice, allowing Maduro to ascend to the presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The result was what has been widely, and misleadingly, referred to as \u2018the Maduro Regime\u2019, but which, in truth, is a Chavista regime \u2013 set up strategically and intentionally with a cast of key players to ensure that the Chavista party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) remains in power indefinitely. Over the past 13 years, members of this cast of players have supported Maduro’s position even as they consolidated power and massive wealth for themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
A comparison can be made to Cuba. In the 2000s many, including many Cubans, assumed that the rule of the Cuban Communist Party\u00a0(CCP)\u00a0would\u00a0come to an end, or at least be significantly weakened by the death of Fidel Castro. Instead, he set up a\u00a0plan to ensure stability in the longer term, handing power over to his brother Ra\u00fal.\u00a0Even then, many assumed that the Castro family was interested in setting up a dynasty \u2013 and with no clear heir\u00a0apparent, the hope was that with the eventual aging out or death of Ra\u00fal Castro, the power structure would fall apart.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2019, however, another orchestrated transition of power began, placing Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel Bermudez as president, and then in 2021 expanding his remit to include the position of First Secretary of the CCP. The CCP remains entrenched in power, despite a dire economic situation and failing critical infrastructure, and has rejected any suggestion of political or social reform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Under Maduro\u2019s leadership, the Venezuelan government was never a totalitarian dictatorship in the classic sense, built around one individual or family, but a complex structure set up deliberately and strategically to ensure the continuity of the Chavista system, just as the Castro system has rolled on even in the absence of any significant Castro family members in visible top leadership positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nCuba and Venezuela are governed under systems built to last, irrespective of the surname of the individual who appears at the top of the power structure, in contrast to, for example, the Kim dynasty in North Korea.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The systems and economies of Cuba and Venezuela have been intricately linked since the 2000s, beginning under the leaderships of Ch\u00e1vez and Castro. Cuba has provided Venezuela not just with military and intelligence support but also personnel to be integrated into and to help reshape Venezuela\u2019s institutions. The military was purged, and purged again, of anyone suspected of any degree of disloyalty to the Chavista government and the PSUV. Armed groups of Chavista militants, called \u2018colectivos\u2019, were set up across the country, at every level – in urban neighborhoods, towns and villages – as brute enforcers of Chavista policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cuba\u2019s systematic use of civilian informants was also applied, but with a 21st<\/sup> century twist. The Chavista government promoted the use of an app through which citizens were encouraged to use their mobile phones to report on their neighbors or anyone else they suspected of \u2018disruptive\u2019 anti-government activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A\u00a0full dismantling of the Chavista system will be extremely\u00a0challenging, and\u00a0could leave significant power vacuums in institutional sectors and geographic parts of the country, generating increased instability.\u00a0Even with\u00a0the forcible removal of Maduro, key power figures remain in place in Venezuela\u00a0at the national level, including\u00a0Cabello,\u00a0Padrino,\u00a0former vice-president and now acting president Delcy\u00a0Rodr\u00edguez, and her brother Jorge Rodr\u00edguez,\u00a0the\u00a0president of Venezuela\u2019s National Assembly. Chavista\u00a0power also extends to the state and local levels; the PSUV holds power in 23 of 25 Venezuelan states and 90% of its municipalities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All of this is supported by\u00a0the military,\u00a0paramilitary\u00a0and intelligence apparatuses\u00a0that have benefited from\u00a0Chavismo and are tasked with defending their position and the\u00a0system\u00a0that allows them to keep it. Cuba\u00a0also has\u00a0a vested interest\u00a0in keeping the Chavista system in place. The CCP has relied\u00a0on Venezuela to\u00a0keep it afloat \u2013 with Venezuelan\u00a0and Mexican\u00a0oil subsidies used to\u00a0prop up its failing power infrastructure\u00a0\u2013 and will\u00a0likely do\u00a0whatever it can to\u00a0maintain\u00a0the status quo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nGiven these dynamics, along with uncertainty and mixed messages from the United States government about its planned next steps, the long-term implications for democracy and human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, are unclear.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
What is clear, however, is that the Chavista government does not seem to be looking to make concessions in this area. Within a day or two of Maduro\u2019s ouster, the colectivos were activated across the country to shut down any hint of protests. They set up roadblocks and went door to door, interrogating those they found and reviewing their devices for any social media activity that might indicate support for the removal of Maduro.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a situation as tense and uncertain as that in which Venezuela finds itself today, Chavista militants, at every level, will be looking for any sign of dissent or disloyalty. Religious leaders, because of the influence they hold in the communities in which they work and in some cases their ability to gather and speak to large groups of people, are likely to be of particular interest to those seeking to keep the Chavistas in power. They will be acutely aware of the history of antagonism<\/a> between the Chavista government and some religious leaders, especially from the Catholic Church, who have expressed criticism of the actions and policies of those in power in the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Leaders of all religious groups, especially those who have not proclaimed allegiance publicly to the Chavista government, will know that their sermons, public prayers and any other statements they make are likely to be scrutinised. They can take the presence of informants in their congregations as a given. In this area, too, the Chavista system has followed a Cuban model \u2013 attacking religious leaders who are openly critical of it or its policies and fomenting division, by setting up programmes that privilege religious groups willing to publicly express support for the regime. These divisions are set to become even starker. There will be increased pressure even on religious leaders who have thus far attempted to remain neutral, or apolitical, to make it clear, and public, where their loyalties lie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Adding to the complexity is the now entrenched presence of the National Liberation Army (ELN), a 60-year-old Colombian guerrilla group with a significant presence in Venezuela. The far-left insurgent group has a long record of severely restricting freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) in areas under its control or influence in Colombia, viewing Protestants, who they consider to be \u2018agents of imperialism\u2019 because of historic links of some to North American missionaries, with particular hostility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Over more than a decade,\u00a0during which time its number of active fighters quadrupled (from an estimated\u00a01500<\/a>\u00a0in 2013 to approximately\u00a06000<\/a>\u00a0in\u00a02025), the\u00a0ELN has\u00a0been provided\u00a0safe haven inside Venezuela. In return, it has\u00a0worked actively with Chavista government forces to secure strategic parts of\u00a0the\u00a0country\u00a0and\u00a0helped\u00a0to ensure \u2018correct\u2019 results of elections and the elimination of civil dissent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ELN is present and active far into the Venezuelan interior including in the Orinoco Mining Arc, and effectively runs a number of municipalities in border states, where it has imposed its own rules on local populations, including rural communities, schools and religious institutions. In some cases, it has pushed out the colectivos and established de facto military control. It, and other illegal armed groups, has reportedly employed the use of drones to carry out constant surveillance of those living there. Religious leaders in these areas have been intimidated and coerced, under explicit threats of violence, into complying with the ELN rules. Many are required to notify the ELN before conducting pastoral activities, including community outreach or any visits involving international organisations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nInside Venezuela, the ELN has applied similar policies towards Protestant religious groups to those it is known for in Colombia.\u00a0Under the ELN rules, religious leaders\u00a0are barred from addressing certain topics publicly,\u00a0including\u00a0during\u00a0religious\u00a0services or community activities.\u00a0These topics include\u00a0extortion, kidnapping, human\u00a0rights, women’s empowerment and migration.\u00a0Some have been barred from using social media and speaking to the press or human rights groups, limiting their ability to communicate community needs or report abuses.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The US\u2019 actions will likely embolden ELN idealogues, confirming and feeding the anti-imperialist narrative on which they have long relied. They are also unlikely to be enthusiastic about losing Venezuela as a base from which to operate, and, if further political destabilisation develops, could widen their military actions into Venezuela to protect their interests. This would have devastating consequences for the civilian population and would likely result in widespread and serious human violations, including violations of FoRB.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While much uncertainty surrounds US plans in regard to Venezuela and how far regime change is likely to extend, there is no doubt that the situation at every level is extremely tense and will probably continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Religious leaders will find themselves in an especially visible and precarious position, with their communities looking to them for reassurance and guidance, even as the eyes and ears of the Chavista government will be trained on them, on the watch for any perceived indication of disloyalty. For many, remaining faithful to the principles of their respective religion and continuing to fulfil their roles as leaders, without attracting the ire of the Chavistas, will involve an often considerable degree of risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By CSW\u2019s Director of Advocacy and Americas Team Leader Anna Lee Stangl<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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