{"id":31001,"date":"2026-09-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T23:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/csw-yeo.1wp.site\/reports\/general-briefing-afghanistan-6904\/"},"modified":"2026-09-23T19:44:32","modified_gmt":"2026-09-23T18:44:32","slug":"general-briefing-afghanistan-6904","status":"publish","type":"reports","link":"https:\/\/www.csw.org.uk\/es\/reports\/general-briefing-afghanistan-6904\/","title":{"rendered":"Informe general: Afganist\u00e1n"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Legal framework<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Islam is the state religion of Afghanistan. The constitution states that followers of other religions may exercise their faith within the limits of the law, however conversion from Islam to another religion is considered apostasy and is punishable by law. There are also punishments for verbally or physically assaulting religious adherents and any insults or distortions directed towards Islam, including online.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Articles 347 and 248 of Afghanistan\u2019s Penal Code address \u2018Crimes Against Religion\u2019, Afghan courts rely on Islamic law to address the issue of blasphemy, which is considered a capital offence for males over the age of 18 and females over the age of 16 and of sound mind. Those accused of blasphemy are given three days to recant or face the death penalty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, Afghanistan\u2019s Media Law of 2004 prohibits writings and other published materials which are considered offensive to Islam or other faiths. Vague wording in this law leaves it open to misuse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Violations of freedom of religion or belief<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Los afganos han experimentado violencia sectaria y violaciones de la libertad de religi\u00f3n o de creencias (LRC) tanto antes como despu\u00e9s de la retirada de las fuerzas de la Organizaci\u00f3n del Tratado del Atl\u00e1ntico Norte (OTAN) en agosto de 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most Afghans are Sunni Muslims, while Shi\u2019as account for approximately 10-15% of the population. Other religious groups, including Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Baha\u2019is officially account for only 0.3% of the population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between 2001, when the Taliban was ousted, and 2021, when they regained power, Afghanistan took some positive steps in terms of women\u2019s rights, education, and FoRB. A new law, for example, mandated the reservation of an additional seat in parliament\u2019s lower house for a member of the Hindu or Sikh communities. However, persistent challenges for ethnic and religious minorities prompted many to leave the country. For example, the Sikh community in Afghanistan had shrunk to fewer than 400 members by 2021, having formerly numbered 1,300 in 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Hazara people are one of the largest ethnic minorities in Afghanistan. Predominantly Shi\u2019a Muslims, they face systematic discrimination and recurrent periods of targeted violence and enforced displacement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aligning with its mission, the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) has been responsible for the enforcement of religious decrees and edicts since the 2021 Taliban takeover, including through corporal and capital punishment. These decrees impact all Afghans and include monitoring men\u2019s beard length, observing the hijab decree, prohibiting music, and segregating men and women in the workplace and public spaces. The MPVPV has also been responsible for imposing restrictions and regulations on religious practices throughout the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under de facto Taliban rule, Afghanistan has experienced a continual and significant decline in FoRB conditions. Taliban authorities have implemented dozens of religious edicts that restrict the right to FoRB of all Afghans, including Sunni Muslims with different interpretations of Islam. Such edicts have disproportionately affected Afghan women and girls as well as religious minorities who remain in the country, including Ahmadiyya Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Shi\u2019a Muslims and Sikhs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Taliban has also been engaged in a conflict with the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) since the 2021 takeover. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban positions and officials, while the Taliban has responded to its insurgency with counter-terrorism efforts. While both groups are Islamist, they hold different interpretations of Islam and have distinct goals. ISIS-K aims to establish a global caliphate, while the Taliban places a more regional emphasis on establishing Islamic law in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Few places of worship remain open for Hindus and Sikhs, while Ahmadiyya Muslims and Christians report that to avoid discrimination and harassment they worship primarily in private or in \u2018nondescript places of worship.\u2019 Hindu and Sikh groups also report difficulties in cremating their dead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In its 2026 annual report<\/a>, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) found that FoRB conditions in Afghanistan remained \u2018extremely poor\u2019 in 2025, with women and Hazaras facing \u2018the most severe restrictions\u2019. Hazaras make up the majority of Afghanistan\u2019s Shi\u2019a population and have been labelled \u2018infidels\u2019 and \u2018unbelievers\u2019 by top Taliban officials and ISIS-K. Such rhetoric has been used to justify violent attacks against the community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In January 2024, for example, an explosion occurred near the Abu Muslim Khorasani Mosque in Kabul. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the minivan explosion that killed at least three people, stating that the attack was part of its campaign against \u2018infidels\u2019 to \u2018kill them wherever you find them.\u2019 The mosque is used by Sunni Muslims, but located in an area where many Shi\u2019a Hazaras reside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In April 2024 ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a mosque in a predominantly Shi\u2019a community of Herat Province. Six worshippers, including the mosque\u2019s imam, were killed in the attack. In July, de facto Taliban authorities destroyed the statue of former Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari in Kabul.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hazara women and girls face intersecting vulnerabilities, and some have reported being subjected to violence, assault, threats, and intimidation while in police custody. In March 2024, for example, the Taliban arrested Hazara human rights defenders Azada Rezaei, Nadia Rezaei and Elaha Rezaei, along with their brother. While the detainees were reportedly released in April, for a period of time their whereabouts were unknown to their family. Taliban authorities had previously detained their sister, Tamana Rezaei, for 29 days in 2022, inflicting \u2018mental and emotional\u2019 torture and reportedly referring to her as an \u2018infidel\u2019 for being Hazara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, the Taliban has reportedly pressured Shi\u2019a Ismaili community members to convert to Sunni Islam. In May 2024, for example, 15 Ismailis were detained in the northeastern province of Badakhshan and were reportedly falsely accused of being affiliated with armed opposition groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In July 2025 a Taliban court sentenced teacher Abdul Alim Khamoosh<\/a> to death for \u2018insulting Shari\u2019a and the Prophet of Islam\u2019 for allegedly telling students that science was more important than religious studies.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Refugees<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Land borders with Afghanistan are mostly sealed, apart from that with Iran. According to statistics from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/a>, there were an estimated 4.4 million Afghan nationals living in Iran as of December 2025, and 1.81 million in Pakistan as of February 2026, however the governments of both countries continue to forcibly repatriate Afghan refugees in large numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In March 2025 the government of Pakistan announced the resumption of the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan, which requires undocumented refugees, including Afghans, to leave the country within 30 days, starting from 1 April. In the same month, the government of Iran launched a regularisation\/return scheme for an estimated two million Afghans, with the majority expected to return to Afghanistan by a deadline of 6 July 2025 or face deportation. The UNHCR informes<\/a> that over 1.4 million Afghans were deported from the two countries in 2025, and a further 413,000 had been deported in 2026 as of 1 August.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hundreds of Afghans have also fled to Uzbekistan<\/a>. However, despite being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the country does not provide admittance for official refugee status, rendering these individuals vulnerable to deportation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On his first day in office, on 20 January 2025, United States (US) President Donald Trump signed an executive order suspending the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which processes refugees for resettlement in the country, effective 27 January. All applications and arrivals through the programme have likewise been suspended. With a sudden halt to USRAP, Afghan refugees, many already approved to enter the US, find themselves in limbo<\/a>, facing instability and the threat of violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many Afghan refugees also face challenges in the countries they have fled to. For example, members of the Shi\u2019a Hazara community are likely to face discrimination in Pakistan due to belonging to the Shi\u2019a branch of Islam. Many members of other religious minorities do not have passports and so find themselves stuck in Pakistan and unable to flee to a third country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Women\u2019s rights under the Taliban<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

In 2023 the Taliban established, expanded, and implemented a series of edicts and decrees to further restrict the rights of Afghan women and girls in society, including their dress, movement, access to education, and employment. In April 2023 the Taliban prevented Afghan women from reporting to work at the UN, expanding its 2022 decrees forbidding women from working in offices or for NGOs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the first half of 2024 de facto Taliban authorities cracked down on Afghan women for failing to observe what authorities deem \u2018proper hijab.\u20191<\/sup><\/b> In January 2024 the Taliban began enforcing its May 2022 hijab decree, dictating that women and girls must fully cover themselves in public. The directive noted that women were not to leave the home except in cases of necessity, and it made male relatives responsible for enforcing the decree or face punishment. The decree states that if the hijab law is not enforced, a woman\u2019s male guardian (mahram<\/i>) will be summoned to the relevant department.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In February 2025 the Taliban suspended the operation of Radio Begum, a Kabul-based radio station run by women that focuses on women\u2019s education. The radio station reported that members of the Taliban\u2019s Ministry of Information and Culture detained the station\u2019s staff during a search of its premises<\/a>.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the August 2021 takeover the authorities have banned girls from receiving an education beyond the sixth grade and barred women from attending universities. They have also removed any topics relating to human rights and women\u2019s rights from school and university curricula, stating that these topics contradict Taliban and Islamic ideology. Recently the Taliban has overseen the removal of curricula that involve inclusive and non-discriminatory approaches to education.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In February 2025 the Taliban\u2019s Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai was reportedly forced to flee to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) following a speech he made at a graduation ceremony in the Khost Province, near the Afghan-Pakistani border, on 20 January in which he criticised the government\u2019s ban on girls attending secondary schools and higher education, prompting the Taliban\u2019s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, to order his arrest and issue a travel ban.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recommendations<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

To the United Nations and Member States:<\/b><\/i><\/p>\n\n\n\n