{"id":31018,"date":"2026-09-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-09-10T23:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/csw-yeo.1wp.site\/reports\/general-briefing-turkiye-6925\/"},"modified":"2026-09-23T19:44:57","modified_gmt":"2026-09-23T18:44:57","slug":"general-briefing-turkiye-6925","status":"publish","type":"reports","link":"https:\/\/www.csw.org.uk\/es\/reports\/general-briefing-turkiye-6925\/","title":{"rendered":"Informaci\u00f3n general: T\u00fcrkiye"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Legal framework<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Article 24 of the Turkish constitution upholds the right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), stating that \u2018everyone has the freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.\u2019 It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, and states that \u2018No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political interest or influence.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Article 2 of the constitution defines T\u00fcrkiye as a secular state, but the country is currently caught between its secular and Islamic identities. A significant deterioration in human rights occurred in the aftermath of the attempted military coup of July 2016. Since then, thousands of journalists, academics, activists, writers, teachers, judges and thinkers have been arrested and accused of being \u2018traitors and collaborators against national interests\u2019. Others have been forced to adopt lower profiles and live in anticipation of being arrested, or to seek asylum in another country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Articles 38-44 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne<\/a>, which established the boundaries of modern T\u00fcrkiye, granted rights and protections to all non-Muslim minorities. However, T\u00fcrkiye has generally restricted recognition under this treaty to the Armenian Orthodox Church, the Greek Orthodox Church and the Jewish Community, thereby excluding the Chaldean Catholic Church, Protestant Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, the Syriac Catholic Church and the Syriac Orthodox Church from enjoying the articulated protections. In practice, the three included religious communities also face violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Turkish Penal Code came into effect on 1 June 2005<\/b>y<\/b>purports to protect \u2018the religious values of a section of the public\u2019 from insult under Article 216. This essentially constitutes a blasphemy law, providing for a sentence of six months to a year for anyone found guilty of openly doing so. However, the law is generally used to target individuals deemed to have insulted Islam in some way, rather than other religions. It has also been used to punish critics of President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi<\/i>, or AKP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Optional Protocols. It is a Member State of the Council of Europe (COE), is party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and several protocols, is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and its policies and practices are monitored by the COE\u2019s Commissioner for Human Rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hostility towards religious minorities<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Despite constitutional protections, and some positive steps taken by the government in recent years, religious minorities are increasingly vulnerable to hate speech, discrimination and intolerance. Although Articles 122 and 216 of the Penal Code criminalise discrimination and incitement to hatred, including on the basis of religion, these provisions are rarely implemented to the fullest extent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The current government has increasingly conflated religious and national identities by publicly endorsing a move towards a Sunni Muslim identity for T\u00fcrkiye, including by showing partiality towards Sunni Islam within the policy of the Diyanet (the Presidency\/Directorate of Religious Affairs). The promotion of ultra-nationalism has contributed to a rise in discrimination and hate speech that encourages hostility and even violence towards non-Sunni religious communities. Such incitement is visible in a variety of sectors ranging from education, the workplace and religious practice, to day-to-day administrative procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alevi Muslims, Baha\u2019is and Christians, particularly those who have converted from Islam, face daily societal pressures. Hate speech and occasional hate crimes targeting religious minorities have continued, including attacks on places of worship and even murder in extreme cases, with perpetrators generally enjoying impunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There has been a surge in the expression of anti-Christian sentiments in pro-government media, and there are increasing reports of incidents of bullying and intimidation of Christian students in schools. Educational books can fuel societal hostility against, and distrust of, religious minorities. For example, textbooks denigrate missionary activity and describe it as a means of dividing the nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Religious education classes are compulsory in public schools, and as members of unrecognised religious and belief communities, children from Alevi, atheist and agnostic backgrounds are obliged to take classes that focus solely on Sunni Islam.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some Christians believe that their community\u2019s situation worsened in the aftermath of the arrest, imprisonment and eventual release of the American pastor Andrew Brunson, who was accused of plotting to overthrow the government. The pastor was released and returned to the United States (US) in October 2018; however, Christians, and particularly converts to Christianity, have continued to be targeted<\/a> with accusations of a variety of malpractices. In some cases, claims have explicitly sought to falsely associate Christians with Pastor Brunson.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent years have also seen a concerning uptick in the forced expulsion of foreign Christian workers and other individuals resident in T\u00fcrkiye after they received N-82 designations in their passports. By August 2025 around 385 foreign workers had reportedly had their residence permits revoked or had been barred from re-entering the country<\/a>. CSW has also received reports that this practice now occurs in Northern Cyprus, amid an increase in anti-Christian sentiment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2021, four expelled foreign Christians launched an appeal at the ECtHR. In a June 2024 decision, the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that the government did not violate the rights of nine foreign Christians, who were reportedly also considering appealing to the ECtHR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 28 January 2024, two masked gunmen invaded Santa Maria Church in B\u00fcy\u00fckdere, Istanbul, during mass. After initially firing into the air, they shot and killed Tuncer Cihan, who had visited the church regularly since December 2023. In this instance the authorities responded swiftly, arresting two suspects who, according to the Interior Ministry, were Islamic State (IS) affiliates from Russia and Tajikistan, and expressing condolences to the church. The attack was reportedly launched in response to a call from IS to target Christians and Jews.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 12 February 2026 the European Parliament adopted a resolution<\/a> strongly condemning the targeted expulsions of foreign Christians and foreign journalists on national security grounds and called on the government to stop using administrative measures that bar individuals from entering or re-entering the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In May 2026, in the case of Mavrakis and Others v. Turkey<\/i>, the ECtHR ruled<\/a> that T\u00fcrkiye had violated the rights of two Greek Orthodox priests by preventing them from serving on the boards of religious minority foundations in \u0130stanbul. The court ordered the state to pay 2,000 Euros in compensation to each complainant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Places of worship<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

While plans for new mosques are authorised by officials, religious minorities \u2013 particularly Alevis, Christians and Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses \u2013 continue to face restrictions on the construction of new houses of worship and the seizure of heritage sites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Alevi community is the country\u2019s largest religious minority. There are estimated to be around over 1,500 Alevi houses of worship, known as cemevis, across the country; however, they are not recognised by the Diyanet. This lack of religious status has financial and other implications, including that cemevis do not receive state funding and must pay standard utility and energy bills.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses enjoy legal recognition, their places of worship, or Kingdom Halls, are still not recognised sufficiently as places of worship, despite a 24 May 2016 ECtHR ruling that addressed the strict application of zoning laws that was used to deny recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 10 July 2020 President Erdo\u011fan announced the government\u2019s decision to turn the Cathedral of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul into a mosque after the highest administrative court in T\u00fcrkiye annulled the site\u2019s museum status. In February 2024 the authorities followed through on a similar effort to convert the Byzantine Chora Church – another UNESCO World Heritage Site in Istanbul – into a mosque, despite protests from Orthodox Christians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2025, as restoration by a joint World Heritage Fund and Turkish team of the Armenian Cathedral of Ani, a World Heritage Site in Kars, was approaching completion, the government announced<\/a> that it would be reopened as the Fethiye (Conquest) Mosque, reigniting \u2018longstanding concerns over Turkey\u2019s systematic erasure of its Christian heritage\u2019.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 21 June 2026 President Erdo\u011fan ordered officials to resume talks regarding the reopening of the Orthodox Halki Seminary, which had been forcibly closed by the government in 1971. The reopening of the seminary faces strong opposition from Islamist and nationalist parties, and previous promises regarding its reopening have not been fulfilled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Situation of refugees and asylum seekers<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The situation of Iranian Christian asylum seekers residing in T\u00fcrkiye lacks clarity as their cases are handled directly by the Turkish authorities and not by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As a result, refugees do not enjoy the full protection of the UNHCR and are vulnerable to intimidation and exploitation by the police and employers. Many refugees work 16 hours per day for half the average earnings of a Turkish employee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iranian and Syrian refugees regularly experience exploitation at workplaces and bullying at schools, with many reportedly obliged to hide their faith in order to keep their jobs. Others have been sacked once their employers discovered they were Christians. In some cities, such as Konya, even Turkish Christians have been forced to leave due to the level of societal hostility towards them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freedom of expression<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Freedom of expression (and of assembly) is increasingly restricted<\/a> through stringent internet censorship, prosecutions, revocation of licenses, broadcast suspensions, and the blocking of the social media accounts of journalists, media organisations, civil society organisations and human rights defenders under Article 8\/A of Law No. 5651 on Regulating Broadcasting in the Internet and Fighting Against Crimes Committed through Internet Broadcasting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Article 217\/A of the Penal Code, also known as the disinformation or censorship law, criminalises \u2018publicly disseminating misleading information\u2019 regarding the country’s internal or external security, public order, or general health. While the article penalises the sharing of misleading information with prison terms and fines, it does not clearly define this, neither does it specify what kind of information constitutes a threat to national security or public order, causing many to self-censure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 14 June 2024 then-30-year-old agnostic and secularist content creator Diamond Tema took part in a YouTube debate about shari\u2019a law with another Turkish social media content creator, Asrin Tok. During the discussion, Mr Tema read a text describing the Prophet Mohammed\u2019s marriage and consummation of the marriage to his final wife, Aisha, when she was six and nine years old respectively, from the Sahih al-Bukhari hadith collection. He stated that he believed such actions were immoral and incompatible with human rights. He asked Asrin Tok if he believed that the text was accurate and for his views on its morality. He also criticised the ruling AKP Party, the Republican People\u2019s Party, Good Party, and other opposition parties for what he called their Islamist leanings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three days later, on 17 June, Mr Tema relocated to Albania after receiving death threats and warnings that he would likely be arrested if he remained in T\u00fcrkiye. The following day a warrant was issued for his arrest for violating Article 216 of the Criminal Code.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recommendations<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

To the government of T\u00fcrkiye:<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n