



INDONESIA: PLURALISM IN PERIL

The rise of religious intolerance across the archipelago

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ABOUT CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY WORLDWIDE & STEFANUS ALLIANCE INTERNATIONAL

CSW works for religious freedom through advocacy and human rights, in the pursuit of justice. We work for freedom of religion or belief for all, and conduct regular fact-finding visits to our countries of focus. We have research and advocacy staff based in London, Brussels and Washington DC, and we work with partner organisations all around the world.

CSW has been working on issues of freedom of religion or belief and related human rights concerns in Indonesia since 1999. In the following years we played a particularly active role in advocacy and post-conflict reconciliation in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, and have subsequently made many fact-finding visits to different religious communities in Indonesia, including in Jakarta, West Java, East Java, South Sulawesi, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Lombok and West Papua.

CSW regularly briefs senior policymakers and legislators around the world, and has testified at hearings in the UK Parliament, the European Parliament, the Japanese Diet, the United States Congress and the United Nations. We also regularly work with international media, and contribute comment and analysis to publications such as the *Wall Street Journal*, the *International Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times*, as well as to broadcasters such as the BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera and Sky. **For further information please visit www.csw.org.uk**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



» **“We must all take strict measures against deviant beliefs.”**

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2007

» **“I hope you are not only here to hear our stories, but to do something, to make something change. The government is ignorant about our situation. There is no religious freedom here any more. The government does not want to hear our cries...We need to give a message to the president. We must remind him that our situation is very critical and we should do something for the future of Indonesia. Support from outside Indonesia is very important, to pressure the president to do something.”**

Reverend Luspida, former church leader of HKBP Ciketing, Bekasi, West Java

» **“Please let the outside world know that we are not safe any longer in our own homes, in our own place. It is not free any more for us to believe in something, to live a normal life, because there are always people who want to force us not to believe what we want to believe...All we want is to live in peace and to freely believe in what we want. That is all.”**

an Ahmadi villager in Tasikmalaya, West Java

» **“The government is inconsistent. It proclaims pluralism and inter-faith dialogue, and so receives international acclaim, but it is very indecisive and reluctant to act. If the government is more confident, then I am more confident we can overcome these challenges. The culture and nature of Indonesia is not extreme. The majority want harmony, tolerance, peace.”**

a representative of Muhammadiyah, one of the two largest Indonesian Muslim organisations

Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, has a long tradition of pluralism, freedom of religion or belief, and inter-religious harmony, and is widely respected around the world for its successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Rising religious intolerance, however, threatens to destroy these achievements, and poses a threat not only to the country's religious minorities but to all Indonesians who value democracy, human rights, peace and stability.¹

Indonesia's pluralism is in peril, and almost all of Indonesia's different religious communities are affected: Ahmadiyah,² Shi'a and Sufi Muslims, Christians – both Protestant and Catholic – as well as Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, Baha'is, adherents of traditional indigenous beliefs, and those of no religion, as illustrated by the case of Alexander Aan, jailed for two and a half years for declaring himself an atheist. Progressive, pluralistic-minded Muslims are also under threat, as shown by the experience of groups such as the Liberal Islam Network, and the attack by radical Islamists on Canadian Muslim feminist author Irshad Manji on 9 May 2012, at a lecture she was giving in Yogyakarta to promote a new book.³ For those unconcerned by attacks on specific beliefs, the

1 *International Herald Tribune*, 'Indonesia's rising religious intolerance', 21 May 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/indonesias-rising-religious-intolerance.html>

2 Note: In Indonesia, the spelling 'Ahmadiyah' is used, and for this reason CSW uses this spelling. In other parts of the world the same community's name is most often spelled 'Ahmadiyya'. The word 'Ahmadi' is used as the adjective.

3 *Jakarta Post*, 'Irshad Manji injured in mob attack in Yogya', 10 May 2012 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/10/irshad-manji-injured-mob-attack-yogya.html>

cancellation of a concert in Jakarta by the pop singer Lady Gaga after threats from radical Islamists⁴ illustrates how wide is the impact of growing extremism in Indonesia. Religious intolerance, once thought to be confined to specific regions, now appears to be spreading nationwide.

With an estimated population of 251 million and a land mass of over 17,000 islands (6,000 inhabited),⁵ Indonesia's tradition of pluralism is enshrined in the nation's motto, 'Unity in diversity', and its guiding philosophy, 'Pancasila', promulgated by former President Sukarno on 1 June 1945 in preparation for the establishment of the independent nation. Without reference to Islam or any other specific religion, it consists of five points:

1. Belief in the one and only God;
2. Just and civilised humanity;
3. The unity of Indonesia;
4. Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives;
5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

While this philosophy does have limitations which should be addressed, including the lack of protection for adherents of religions outside the six religions recognised by the constitution (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism), and for those of no religion, it is in essence a philosophy which was designed to protect pluralism in a Muslim-majority nation. An estimated 86.1% of the population is Muslim, while 5.7% is Protestant, 3% Catholic, 1.8% Hindu and 3.4% belong to 'other' or 'unspecified' religions, which include Buddhism, Confucianism and unrecognised traditional indigenous beliefs.⁶

In recent years, however, a variety of radical Islamist organisations have emerged and gained a disproportionate influence over policymaking and implementation.⁷ "Pancasila has come to face sustained challenges and attacks from the Islamists," argues Masdar Hilmy, a lecturer at the State Institute for Islamic Studies Sunan Ampel, in Surabaya. While Indonesian Islam "has enjoyed the reputation of being a distinctive and tolerant variant of Islam compatible with democracy," Hilmy adds, "this rosy assumption is being challenged by the upsurge of Islamist activism in Indonesia."⁸ These elements range from Islamist political parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), sometimes known as the Justice and Welfare Party, which along with two other Islamist parties is now in the governing coalition, holding cabinet-level ministerial positions; to Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and other similar organisations disseminating the intellectual narrative that is poisoning Indonesia's traditional pluralistic philosophy; to the violent, vigilante Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), spreading intolerance, advocating discriminatory legislation and regulations impeding the freedom of religious minorities, and leading to a growing atmosphere of intimidation and violence. Of these, the vast majority of incidents of violence and harassment are perpetrated by the FPI, making this group the main actor – but the other groups contribute significantly to shaping the discourse. In addition, secular political parties such as Golkar have pandered to the Islamist narrative, perceiving a need to appeal to religiously conservative constituencies at a local level.

On 6 February 2011 a mob of 1,500 people attacked 21 Ahmadis in Cikeusik, Banten Province, West Java, killing three and injuring at least five others. In November 2011 an estimated 600 people burned down a Hindu centre in Sukabumi, West Java. Between 1 and 3 May 2012 the local authorities forced 17 churches to close in Aceh.⁹ On 14 June 2012 an atheist, Alexander Aan, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison, initially charged with blasphemy and finally sentenced under the Electronic Information and Transaction Law for "disseminating information aimed at inciting religious hatred and hostility", because he posted his views about religion on Facebook. In August 2012 the Shi'a community in Sampang, East Java was attacked, displacing hundreds and resulting in at least two deaths. A Shi'a cleric from the community, Tajul Muluk, is in prison on charges of blasphemy. In 2013 a low-intensity bomb attack at a Buddhist temple in Jakarta,¹⁰ and threats of further

4 *Guardian*, 'Lady Gaga cancels Indonesia show after threat from Muslim extremists', 27 May 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2012/may/27/lady-gaga-indonesia-cancel-muslim>

5 CIA World Factbook, Indonesia <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>

6 *ibid.*

7 Setara Institute, 2010

8 Hilmy, 2010:1

9 World Watch Monitor, 'Harsh Era Looms in Aceh, Indonesia', 16 May 2012 http://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2012/05-May/article_1541045.html/

10 *Jakarta Globe*, 'Explosion at Indonesian Buddhist Temple Injures Three: Police', 5 August 2013 <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/jakarta/explosion-at-indonesian-buddhist-temple-injures-one-police/>

attacks against other Buddhist sites, occurred.¹¹ In May 2013 one of Indonesia's last remaining synagogues, Beth Shalom in Surabaya, was destroyed.¹² Adherents of traditional indigenous beliefs are not able to state their religion on their identity cards, so they must either adopt one of the six recognised religions or leave the column blank. Either option results in a violation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and severe discrimination. These are just a few examples of a long catalogue of incidents. There is a widespread belief among many in Indonesia, including secular human rights NGOs, Muslim counter-extremist organisations, Protestant and Catholic churches, the Ahmadiyah Muslim community, foreign diplomats and others, that the situation is worsening. Some activists and commentators have expressed concern that the rise of religious intolerance in Indonesia will endanger the nation's founding principles of tolerance and pluralism, in a similar way to the situation in Pakistan. As Fajar Riza Ul Haq, the executive director of the Maarif Institute, an organisation using Islamic values to promote inter-faith dialogue, told CSW, "Indonesia is not the same as Pakistan, but it is not impossible for Indonesia to become like Pakistan if the government does not develop strong policies to protect human rights, religious freedom and minorities."

There appear to be five factors contributing to the rise of religious intolerance:

1. The spread of extremist ideology, fuelled and funded by sources outside Indonesia (notably Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other parts of the Middle East, and Pakistan) as well as domestic organisations, through education, preaching and the dissemination of literature through publishing pamphlets and books, DVDs and CDs, and via the internet;
2. The inaction and at times complicity of the local, provincial and national authorities, including active complicity by senior government ministers who have made statements which contribute to intolerance;
3. The implementation of discriminatory laws and regulations;
4. Weakness in terms of law enforcement on the part of the police and the judiciary, in cases where religious minorities are victims in need of protection and justice;
5. The unwillingness on the part of the majority of Indonesian Muslims, who make up over 86% of the population,¹³ to speak out against intolerance.

Several sources told CSW that there is a 'silent majority' who do not approve of the rising extremism and intolerance, but do not do anything to challenge it. Mr Ul Haq told CSW that the majority of Indonesians are still tolerant but they hold to a 'passive tolerance'. The Catholic Archbishop of Jakarta, however, believes extremism is having an increasing influence on societal attitudes, referring to a 'passive intolerance'. Ahmad Suaedy, coordinator of the Abdurrahman Wahid Centre for Inter-Faith Dialogue and Peace at the University of Indonesia, and senior researcher at the Wahid Institute, describes it as 'the mainstreaming of intolerance'. Indonesia does appear to have moved away from the dramatic, large-scale inter-religious conflicts of the kind witnessed in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi over a decade ago, involving a significant movement of violent jihadis, and from the campaign of terrorist bombings. However, intolerance has now become more ingrained and more mainstream, taking the form of low-intensity but more widespread and accepted discrimination and persecution, sometimes including violence but often involving discriminatory laws and hate speech.

With regard to the role of the government, it is clear that at times ministers, including the president himself, have not simply been guilty of gross negligence, but have in fact been proactively complicit. While President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been regarded by the international community as a force of moderation, he has in fact been neither a force, nor particularly moderate. He has made many statements which contain rhetoric that opposes intolerance and promotes pluralism and harmony; but it should be noted that early in his presidency, in 2005, he made a speech to the National Congress of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), the highest body of Islamic clerics in Indonesia, funded by the government, promising them "a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith" and pledging an openness to the MUI's *fatwas* (religious rulings) "at any time". Such remarks offered conservatives and Islamists a green light, and within days a series of *fatwas* was issued which served to undermine completely the notions of pluralism on which Indonesia was founded, and the principles of freedom

11 Al Jazeera, 'Indonesia temple attacks prompt concern', 8 August 2013 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/08/20138873330947299.html>

12 Jakarta Globe, 'Java's Last Synagogue Torn Down', 15 June 2013 <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/javas-last-synagogue-torn-down/>

13 US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report 2012 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper>

of religion or belief as set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is a party. Two years later, the president went even further, telling the MUI that after a *fatwa* is issued, “the tools of the state can do their duty...We must all take strict measures against deviant beliefs.”

The government has not only been complicit by making remarks that give encouragement to intolerance; it has actively implemented a series of regulations and laws (particularly the 2006 Joint Regulation on Houses of Worship and the 2008 anti-Ahmadiyah Joint Decree, and shari’a-inspired local regulations¹⁴) which are inherently discriminatory and which violate the principles of Article 18 of the UDHR and the ICCPR as well as Indonesia’s own constitution; and it has repeatedly refused to amend or repeal previous discriminatory laws, notably the 1965 blasphemy law and the regulations regarding the religion column on the identity card.

In addition to active complicity, the authorities, including the government, the judiciary and the security forces at a national, provincial and local level, are accused by many of weakness and a failure to uphold the rule of law and principles of justice. As Reverend Gomar Gultom, general secretary of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI), told CSW, “[T]he most worrying...development is the absence of the state. In various acts of violence...it looked as if the police were helpless and even tended to let the violence occur in front of them.” This view is widely shared. A representative of Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Indonesian Muslim organisations, told CSW, “[T]he absence of the government is a trigger for increasing violence.” The *Economist*, in an article in June 2012, concluded that the weakness of the government has “appeared only to embolden extremist groups, which now feel that they can act with impunity.”¹⁵

“THE ABSENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS A TRIGGER FOR INCREASING VIOLENCE.”

This ‘absence of the state’ is illustrated most starkly by the high profile cases of the closure of two churches, GKI Yasmin in Bogor and HKBP Filadelfia in Bekasi, West Java. CSW has visited both churches and their cases are detailed in this report (see section ‘Violence, harassment and intimidation’). In both cases the churches have been approved by the courts, but the local authorities are refusing to allow them to open. In the case of GKI Yasmin, the Supreme Court ruled on 14 January 2011 that the church was legal and should be allowed to open, but the local mayor continues to defy the Supreme Court and no action has been taken to enforce the court ruling.

Perpetrators of violence against minorities behave with impunity, with disproportionately small penalties imposed in some cases. For example, 17 people responsible for the destruction of churches in Temanggung, Central Java were sentenced to only four to five months in jail, and the murderers of three Ahmadis in Cikeusik were jailed for only three to five months.¹⁶

A new phenomenon is now emerging of ‘criminalisation’ of the victims of persecution, whereby a growing number of Christian church leaders, Ahmadis and Shi’a have been arrested, charged and in some cases jailed on fabricated charges - even after they themselves have been attacked and the perpetrators of the attacks have not been brought to justice. In May 2013 the Human Rights Working Group, an Indonesian NGO, published an open letter to the United Nations special rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief; extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; and peaceful assembly and association, detailing these concerns.¹⁷

The only positive signs of interest in addressing these issues are from the media, particularly the English language newspapers the *Jakarta Post* and the *Jakarta Globe*, which give extensive coverage; and from some legislators. It was reported in May 2012 that the House of Representatives Commission overseeing legal affairs and human rights summoned the National Police chief General Timur Pradopo to answer questions about police

14 Gatestone Institute, ‘Sharia Law Swallowing Indonesia’, 7 February 2013 <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3579/indonesia-sharia>

15 *Economist*, ‘Islam in Indonesia: Tolerating intolerance’, 9 June 2012 <http://www.economist.com/node/21556618>

16 *Jakarta Post*, ‘Religious intolerance in Indonesia’s reform era’, 18 May 2012 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/18/religious-intolerance-indonesia-s-reform-era.html>

17 *Jakarta Globe*, ‘Human Rights Group Calls Out Persecution of Bekasi Church Leader’, 2 May 2013 <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/human-rights-group-calls-out-persecution-of-bekasi-church-leader/>

failures to prevent violence against religious minorities.¹⁸ There is widespread criticism, however, of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in particular, who is accused of weakness.

Even though it may be the case that the majority of Indonesians disapprove of extremism and intolerance, a growing number of Indonesian Muslims are being radicalised, according to recent studies by organisations such as the Wahid Institute¹⁹ and the Setara Institute.²⁰ The intolerant minority is increasing in influence and in number. A report published by the *International Journal of Press/Politics* in 2011, based on research carried out by the Pantau Foundation, claims that 63% of Indonesian journalists surveyed approved a series of conservative *fatwas* criticising secularism, pluralism and liberalism, issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) - the principal umbrella organisation for clerics which advises the Indonesian government on religious affairs; and 64% backed the banning of the Ahmadiyah. At least 20% agree with the use of violence.²¹ Of further concern is the finding of a survey conducted by Indonesia's Islamic State University, which found that 40% of students in non-religious schools approve of violence as a way of resolving religious or moral arguments.²²

Several Muslim organisations are carrying out important counter-extremism programmes, and are speaking out against intolerance on behalf of religious minorities. These include the Wahid Institute, the Maarif Institute, the International Center for Islam and Pluralism, and the Liberal Islam Network. There is, however, a need for a more fully integrated counter-extremism strategy, to be supported by both the government of Indonesia and the international community. As Fajar Riza Ul Haq told CSW, "[S]lowly but surely our public space is getting smaller."

In 2014 Indonesia will hold elections, both to the parliament and for the presidency. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will leave office after a decade as president, and the country will elect a new leader. It is essential that these issues of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as set out in Article 18 of the UDHR, are placed before the presidential candidates and the incoming government. It is crucial that the new president and government take concrete steps to change course, moving Indonesia away from the path of spiralling intolerance and back to its roots and founding values as a pluralistic nation. It is vital that the international community prioritises these concerns in its interactions with Indonesia, and offers all means of support to those in Indonesia who wish to counter rising religious intolerance. The new president and government could base much of their approach on the non-legislative principles of the new Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, drafted and adopted by three United Nations special rapporteurs, covering freedom of expression and opinion; freedom of religion or belief; and racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in Rabat, Morocco, on 5 October 2012.²³ As the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide said, "National and local authorities can exacerbate the severity of the speech, but they have also the potential to counter hate speech through positive speech and messages of tolerance and restraint."²⁴ Indonesia is at a crossroads, and if responsible actors both within the country and in the international community do not respond to these challenges effectively, Indonesia's pluralism will be in peril.

18 *Jakarta Post*, 'House to summon police chief on violence', 19 May 2012 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/19/house-summon-police-chief-violence.html>

19 See www.wahidinstitute.org

20 See www.setara-institute.org/en

21 Pintak & Sediyo, 2010


22 Radio Australia, 'High approval of violence among Indonesian students', 28 April 2011 <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/connectasia/stories/201104/s3202439.htm>

23 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf

24 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Between Free Speech and Hate Speech: The Rabat Plan of Action, a practical tool to combat incitement to hatred', 21 February 2013 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/TheRabatPlanofAction.aspx>



RECOMMENDATIONS



To the government of Indonesia:

1. To promote and protect Indonesia's tradition of religious pluralism as set out in Pancasila and the constitution;
2. To investigate fully violations of religious freedom, including violent attacks and continuous intimidation campaigns against religious minorities, and to bring perpetrators to justice;
3. To ensure that the rule of law is upheld, and that judicial rulings are respected, implemented and enforced;
4. To repeal or amend all laws, including shari'a-inspired regulations, which contravene the constitution and Pancasila;
5. To act immediately to protect Christian churches and communities from violent attacks, intimidation and harassment, and to permit the construction of churches which have received licences through the approved process;
6. To act immediately to protect Ahmadiyah Muslim communities, and to ensure that perpetrators of violence are brought to justice;
7. To act immediately to protect Shi'a Muslim communities, and to ensure that perpetrators of violence are brought to justice;
8. To act immediately to protect Sufi Muslim communities, and to ensure that perpetrators of violence are brought to justice;
9. To act immediately to protect all other religious communities, including adherents of unrecognised traditional indigenous beliefs, and individuals who hold no particular belief or atheistic beliefs;
10. To consider ways of amending or repealing the blasphemy and heresy laws, including clarifying the definitions, and strengthening the requirements for proof of intent and evidence;
11. To ensure recognition, protection and equal rights for all forms of religion or belief, theistic, atheistic and non-theistic, as set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including for those outside the six officially recognised religions;
12. To abolish the religion column on identity cards, as recommended by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its review of Indonesia under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, on 15 August 2007 (CERD/C/IDN/CO/3);²⁵
13. To support the efforts of Muslim and other faith-based and secular civil society organisations working to promote pluralism, harmony and religious freedom, and counter radicalism and extremism;
14. To revise the curriculum for religious education in schools, ensuring both that adherents of religions or beliefs not recognised officially by the state are free to practise their own beliefs and are not compelled or coerced to practise other religions, and that adherents of religions are taught the basic tenets of the different religions practised in Indonesia, in a balanced and accurate way, thus enhancing mutual understanding;
15. To investigate and publish information concerning the influence regarding funding and other resources, of external intolerant or Islamist elements, particularly from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, and to take steps to ensure transparency regarding the number of students travelling abroad to study, the provision of scholarships, and foreign funding of mosques, *pesantren* and other religious institutions in Indonesia;

25 For the full recommendations, see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf>

16. To appoint a chief of the Indonesian National Police with a clear commitment to a policy of zero tolerance for incitement to violence or acts of violence;
17. To adopt a policy across government ensuring that no one with a known record of intolerant or extremist speech or actions would receive government funding or be permitted to be employed in or given a platform by any government institution, or to participate together with government officials in any official operations or duties;
18. To consider implementing the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief's report of December 2013 on manifestations of collective religious hatred;²⁶
19. To consider implementing the non-legislative measures proposed by the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, adopted by the UN Special Rapporteurs on freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of religion or belief; and racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; in Rabat, Morocco, on 5 October 2012;²⁷
20. To consider withdrawing candidates who promote hatred and intolerance during election campaigns, and to remove officials who promote hatred and intolerance;
21. To review the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the influence of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in policymaking, to ensure that their functions are discharged consistent with the constitution and Pancasila;
22. To extend an official invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit Indonesia;²⁸
23. To implement the recommendations of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in respect to freedom of religion or belief;²⁹
24. To implement the recommendations of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations with respect to Indonesia's compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;³⁰
25. To ensure that all the recommendations which were accepted by the government of Indonesia during the Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations in 2012 are implemented, including but not limited to the following: the establishment of a fully implementable national action plan which guarantees full protection of vulnerable groups; a review of existing laws and policies, and their repeal or amendment where necessary to ensure their compatibility with the right to freedom of religion or belief, in line with Indonesia's constitution and its international obligations; steps to ensure that all ministerial decrees regulating religious life, as well as all local regulations relating to religion, are in conformity with international human rights law; the establishment of training courses and awareness campaigns for provincial and municipal officials in respect for the rule of law and with regard to protecting the freedom of religion and other rights of members of religious groups; legislative action including effective prosecution of the incitement of hatred and acts of violence against all religious minorities; intensification of efforts to take all necessary measures to stop violence and discrimination against religious groups.

26 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council 25th Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, 26 December 2013 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-58_en.doc

27 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf

28 As recommended by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 26 April 2011

29 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay at a press conference during her mission to Indonesia', 13 November 2012 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12781&LangID=E>

30 Centre for Civil and Political Rights, Overview of the 108th session of the Human Rights Committee <http://www.ccprcentre.org/publication/overview-of-the-sessions/108-session-overview/>

To the European Union and all member states:

1. To raise concerns about rising levels of violent attacks on religious minorities, and campaigns of intimidation and harassment, and to urge the Indonesian authorities to provide proper protection for religious minorities vulnerable to attack and intimidation;
2. To urge the Indonesian authorities to respect and protect freedom of religion or belief and to permit the construction of places of worship which have received licences through the approved process;
3. To provide financial support for human rights, civil society, inter-faith dialogue and cooperation initiatives, and counter-extremism work, and to engage proactively with the efforts of Muslim, other faith-based and secular civil society organisations working to promote pluralism, harmony and religious freedom, and counter radicalism and extremism;
4. To urge the government of Indonesia to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit the country;
5. To ensure that all the recommendations which were accepted by the government of Indonesia during the Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations in 2012 are implemented;
6. To urge the government of Indonesia to take the actions called for and recommended in a resolution by the European Parliament in 2011;³¹
7. To implement fully the European Union Guidelines on promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief,³² and the Guidelines on human rights defenders;³³
8. To ensure that freedom of religion or belief is a priority concern in the European Union's human rights dialogue with Indonesia;³⁴
9. To prioritise freedom of religion or belief and efforts to counter religious intolerance as part of the EU-Indonesia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and progress towards the establishment of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.³⁵

To the government of the United States:

1. To raise concerns about rising levels of violent attacks on religious minorities, and campaigns of intimidation and harassment, and to urge the Indonesian authorities to provide proper protection for religious minorities vulnerable to attack and intimidation;
2. To urge the Indonesian authorities to respect and protect freedom of religion or belief and to permit the construction of places of worship which have received licences through the approved process;
3. To provide financial support for human rights, civil society, inter-faith dialogue and cooperation initiatives and counter-extremism work, and to engage proactively with the efforts of Muslim, other faith-based and secular civil society organisations working to promote pluralism, harmony and religious freedom, and counter radicalism and extremism;

31 European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2011 on Indonesia, including attacks on minorities <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0341+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

32 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, 24 June 2013 http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137585.pdf

33 European External Action Service, 'Ensuring protection – European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders' http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/defenders/docs/16332-re02_08_en.pdf

34 European External Action Service, 'EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries – Update' http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/dialogues/docs/16526_08_en.pdf

35 Delegation to Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN, 'Political and Economic Relations' http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/eu_indonesia/political_relations/index_en.htm

4. To continue to monitor the situation in Indonesia, noting the recommendation of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom to categorise Indonesia as a country on the 'Watch List';³⁶
5. To press the government of Indonesia to invite the US Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom to visit the country;
6. To urge the government of Indonesia to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit the country;
7. To ensure that all the recommendations which were accepted by the government of Indonesia during the Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations in 2012 are implemented.

To the government of Canada:

1. To raise concerns about rising levels of violent attacks on religious minorities, and campaigns of intimidation and harassment, and to urge the Indonesian authorities to provide proper protection for religious minorities vulnerable to attack and intimidation;
2. To urge the Indonesian authorities to respect and protect freedom of religion or belief and to permit the construction of places of worship which have received licences through the approved process;
3. To provide financial support for human rights, civil society, inter-faith dialogue and cooperation initiatives and counter-extremism work, and to engage proactively with the efforts of Muslim, other faith-based and secular civil society organisations working to promote pluralism, harmony and religious freedom, and counter radicalism and extremism;
4. To continue to monitor and report on the situation in Indonesia;
5. To press the government of Indonesia to invite the Canadian Ambassador of Religious Freedom to visit the country;³⁷
6. To urge the government of Indonesia to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit the country;
7. To ensure that all the recommendations which were accepted by the government of Indonesia during the Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations in 2012 are implemented.

To the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN):

1. To raise concerns about rising levels of violent attacks on religious minorities, and campaigns of intimidation and harassment, and to urge the Indonesian authorities to provide proper protection for religious minorities vulnerable to attack and intimidation;
2. To urge the Indonesian authorities to respect and protect freedom of religion or belief and to permit the construction of places of worship which have received licences through the approved process;
3. To consider ways in which the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights could assist Indonesia in addressing these concerns;

³⁶ United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Indonesia <http://www.uscifr.gov/countries/1384.html?task=view>

³⁷ Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Canada's Office of Religious Freedom http://www.international.gc.ca/religious_freedom-liberte_de_religion/index.aspx?lang=eng

4. To urge Indonesia to ensure that its legislation and policies are in accordance both with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the principles of the ASEAN Charter;³⁸
5. To urge the government of Indonesia to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit the country;
6. To ensure that all the recommendations which were accepted by the government of Indonesia during the Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations in 2012 are implemented.

To the United Nations and the international community:

1. To ensure that all the recommendations which were accepted by the government of Indonesia during the Universal Periodic Review in 2012 are implemented, and to monitor progress;
2. To press the government of Indonesia for progress on implementing the recommendations of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in respect to freedom of religion or belief;³⁹
3. To urge the government of Indonesia to implement the recommendations of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations with respect to Indonesia's compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;⁴⁰
4. To urge the government of Indonesia to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to visit the country.

38 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-charter/asean-charter>

39 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay at a press conference during her mission to Indonesia', 13 November 2012 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12781&LangID=E>

40 Centre for Civil and Political Rights, Overview of the 108th session of the Human Rights Committee <http://www.ccprcentre.org/publication/overview-of-the-sessions/108-session-overview/>



CONCLUSIONS



» **“The majority of Indonesians are tolerant – but they are passive, they don’t do anything. And the government is afraid of the radicals. The radicals are a minority, but they are very loud, and the government does not do anything.”**

Reverend Palti Panjaitan, HKBP Filadelfia, Bekasi

» **“The international community should continue to play an important role in encouraging and reminding Indonesia what it stands for, and not to betray all that of which it is justly proud.”**

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, senior adviser to the vice-president of Indonesia

In the heart of Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital city, is a powerful physical symbol of the country’s tradition of pluralism. Standing side by side are the Istiqlal Mosque, the largest in south-east Asia, and the Catholic cathedral. The mosque was designed by a Christian architect.

The senior adviser to the vice-president of Indonesia, Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, told CSW that pluralism is part of the “Indonesian character”. She said, “We don’t just tolerate each other, we live together. The fabric of Indonesia has always been a mosaic. We don’t regard difference as an issue. People live with and celebrate difference. Indonesia has more religious holidays than anywhere else in the world. This is an affirmation that both officially and culturally, Indonesia is very much celebrating difference.”

That ‘fabric’ of Indonesia is, however, increasingly being torn. Today, the MUI, the council of Islamic clerics, forbids Muslims from uttering the greeting ‘Merry Christmas’. That is how far Indonesia has already travelled from the principles of Pancasila. However flawed Pancasila is, in that it does not protect those outside the six recognised religions, it at least offers some principles of pluralism and freedom of religion. It needs to be built upon and expanded.

One pattern that is striking throughout many of the testimonies in this report is the repeated fact that the cause of hostilities often comes from outsiders coming into a village or town, not from local people. Time after time, Christians, Ahmadis and Shi’as repeatedly said that they had had very good relationships with their Sunni Muslim neighbours – until outside elements came in. The question therefore is how to counter the radical influences.

Archbishop Suharyo Hardjoatmodjo, the Catholic Archbishop of Jakarta, says the future “depends on the government”. If the government upholds law and order, he concludes, “The radicals will not have strength.” But, he adds, “As long as the government uses religion as an instrument of power, I am afraid it will get worse. It can easily get worse, but it should be better.” If action is not taken to rein in the Islamists, change the discourse, review discriminatory laws, protect vulnerable communities, bring perpetrators of violence to justice, and uphold freedom of religion for all, Indonesia’s pluralism will be in grave peril, and the world will have lost its role model of pluralistic, progressive Muslim-majority democracy.

Some in government acknowledge this. Dr Anwar admits that attacks against churches, Ahmadis and Shi’as are concerning, because such intolerance “gives Indonesia’s international image a bad name and is an attack on Indonesia’s own identity: unity in diversity”. She believes the majority of Indonesians do not support such intolerance, but they “tend to be silent”.

In her remarks to CSW, Dr Anwar spelled out a number of steps that the government could take, acknowledging the criticisms over police and government inaction:

1. On policing, she said, “The police are fairly small and weak, and have sometimes been victims of violence themselves”. Since becoming a democracy, “The military has been taken out of the internal security system, and the responsibility is in the hands of the police.” In many areas, police presence is low. “We need to improve capacity and coordination.”

2. In regard to regional autonomy laws, the central government must take action to assert control over its areas of responsibility. "The government has given 24 functions to local governments. Six main functions are held by central government: foreign policy, defence and security, judiciary, justice, fiscal policy and religion." The question then arises: if religious affairs are a function of national government, why are there so many provincial, district and other local regulations and bylaws relating to religion? "Local leaders are absolved of responsibility for religion," she says. "There is confusion about who is responsible for religious schools, mosques and so on. Central government should respect itself more and uphold the rule of law and the authority of central government."
3. In education, there is a need to review the national curriculum. "The quality of religious education is very poor," she observes.²⁶⁹ "Mosques are under-funded, they are unable to get good people to give sermons, a lot of mosques are under the sway of radical groups who offer free services, and the people who control the mosques think that these radicals are just volunteers, without realising their agenda." On university campuses, faculties do not pay enough attention to extra-curricular activities, she notes. Under the constitution, 20% of the national budget is reserved for education; but all religious institutions, including *pesantren* and Islamic state universities, come under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
4. With regard to recognition of religions, Dr Anwar says that official recognition of six religions is not intended to discriminate against other religions. "The state recognises the official religions, but it does not say that other religions should not exist. To recognise all religions would impact on issues such as national holidays, directorates within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and various other aspects of government and national life. The problem is that recognition is seen as meaning that only official religions can exist. That should not be the case. It is not meant as permission to persecute others."
5. On the ban on inter-religious marriages, she believes that "the state should not have a role in deciding who should and should not marry."

The president, she concludes, "understands the criticisms and believes people are right to express those criticisms. The international community should continue to play an important role in encouraging and reminding Indonesia what it stands for, and not to betray all that of which it is justly proud."

If the government of Indonesia were to implement even some of the suggestions expressed to CSW by the vice-president's own adviser, it would go a long way towards addressing the concerns detailed in this report. As Sidney Jones told CSW, "It is extremely difficult to repeal laws, but it is possible to prevent more bad laws being adopted".²⁷⁰ The new president could take some of the steps detailed in the Recommendations in this report, and promote a culture of pluralism to counter intolerance. If the international community were to take up the invitation by the vice-president's adviser, to impress upon the government of Indonesia the significance of these concerns and provide constructive assistance in addressing them, there is still a chance of preventing Indonesia continuing along the path of religious intolerance.

"The problem here is not society, it is the state," concludes Franz Magnis-Suseno, SJ. "Of course, there are some radicals, but with the large mainstream Islamic community, members of NU and Muhammadiyah, we have very good relations. We understand each other, we can talk to each other about our problems. It is therefore not society, it is a question of the state: the indecisiveness of central government, and totally opportunistic administrators in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Cases such as GKI Yasmin and HKBP Filadelfia should not happen in a state where there is the rule of law. The Supreme Court ruling should have been observed. These things will happen more and more if we allow gangster power to prevail."

As Dr Muridan Widjojo, a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, told CSW, Indonesia "is not something that is finished". Indonesia deserves praise for its transition from authoritarianism to democracy, its thriving civil society and media, and its longstanding tradition of pluralism and religious freedom. All of these, however, are at risk if action is not taken to uphold basic human rights.

269 Many observers argue that the quality of education overall is poor. See Portrait Indonesia, 'Indonesian kids don't know how stupid they are', 5 December 2013 <http://portraitindonesia.com/indonesian-kids-dont-know-how-stupid-they-are/>

270 For further explanation, see Parsons & Mietzner, 2009

If Indonesia can pull back from the path towards radical Islamism, provide genuine protection and equal rights for religious minorities, and ensure that the rule of law is upheld, it will have earned its reputation and will continue to develop as a role model for others in Asia and among Muslim-majority nations. If it fails, however, its reputation for pluralism and democracy is at stake. If Indonesia abandons pluralism, the geopolitical consequences will be significant: the world will have lost a role model of tolerant, moderate Islam, and Indonesia's democratic success will be in jeopardy.

As a recent member of the UN Human Rights Council, previous chair of ASEAN and a member of the G20, Indonesia has a fundamental responsibility to ensure that it upholds the rights and freedoms set out in its own constitution, and in international covenants and treaties to which it is a party. The international community, including the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, Canada and ASEAN, has a responsibility to support Indonesia in its struggle against radicalism; to encourage it to continue to develop its institutions of democracy, civil society and justice; and to urge it to defend its tradition of pluralism and religious freedom and to uphold the rule of law. It is in all our interests to do so.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

p.7 Executive summary

Top: GKI Yasmin Church, Bogor, West Java. Christians forced to worship outside their closed church. See p.64.

Bottom: Shi'a Muslims in a displacement camp. See p.79.

p.13 Recommendations

Top: HKBP Filadelfia Church, Bekasi, West Java. The church was forcibly closed. The sign reads 'This building is sealed'. See p.59.

Bottom: Note smuggled out of prison from Alexander Aan, the imprisoned atheist. See p.85. The full text reads: "May everything [be] in goodness and happiness. I love all. I cannot accept doctrine which separates some [people] from others. Let's live together in love, fight in love, without violence, but with love and brains."

p.19 Introduction

Top: Dr Rebekka Zakaria and two other Sunday school teachers in court during their trial. See p.67.

Bottom: Open air Christian Sunday service and multi-religious demonstration outside the Presidential Palace, Jakarta. See p.59.

p.23 The foundations of Indonesia

Top left: Statue engraved with Pancasila, Indonesia's national ideology. See p.26.

Top right: Shi'a Muslim child in a displacement camp. See p.79.

Bottom left: HKBP Filadelfia Church, Bekasi, West Java. The congregation is worshipping outside, surrounded by police and an Islamist mob. See p.59.

Bottom right: Iklil al-Milal, brother of Tajul Muluk, a Shi'a Muslim cleric imprisoned for his beliefs. See p.79.

p.29 The role of the government

Top: Protest against the World Statesman Award for religious freedom awarded to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2013. See p.20.

Bottom: HKI Church, Singkil, Aceh. The church was closed and evacuated, but now the congregation is trying to re-establish it.

p.38 Parmalim cleric in Nagapaloh, Singkil, Aceh. See p.84.

p.43 Sources of intolerance

Top: Sign outside Ahmadi mosque in Bekasi, West Java. The sign quotes from various pieces of discriminatory legislation, including the 2008 anti-Ahmadiyah Joint Decree. See p.72.

Bottom: Islamic militants arriving at a courthouse for the trial of Dr Rebekka Zakaria, a Christian Sunday school teacher. Hundreds gathered for each hearing, shouting "Kill Rebekka, burn Rebekka!" See p.67.

p.46 Biskang GKPPD Church, Singkil, Aceh. The church is at risk of being forcibly closed.

p.53 Violence, harassment and intimidation

Top left: Alexander Aan, an atheist imprisoned for his beliefs. See p.85.

Top right: Shi'a Muslims in a displacement camp. See p.79.

Bottom left: Keras GKPPD Church, Singkil, Aceh. In 2012 the government shut down all unregistered churches, like this one. See p.58.

Bottom right: An Ahmadi stands outside a burned out Ahmadi house in Lombok. See p.71.

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Top: Kuta Keranjang GKPPD Church, Singkil, Aceh. The only church in the area which has been able to register legally.

Top: Sijungjung Prison, where the atheist Alexander Aan was imprisoned. See p.85.

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Top left: The Catholic cathedral in Jakarta. See p.92.

Top right: Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta. The largest mosque in south-east Asia, it was designed by a Christian architect. See p.92.

Bottom: The wife of Tajul Muluk, a Shi'a Muslim cleric imprisoned for his beliefs. See p.79.

All photos: CSW, except front cover: REUTERS/Enny Nuraheni, p.23 top right and bottom right, p.29 bottom, p.53 bottom left, p.87 top and p.91 bottom: Firdaus Mubarik.

**“I HOPE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS WILL
PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT,
BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUT
ITS HANDS UP, IT DOES NOT KNOW
WHAT TO DO ANY MORE,
SO CIVIL SOCIETY NEEDS TO UNITE
THE INTER-FAITH COMMUNITY TO
WORK TOGETHER.**

**MY LAST HOPE IS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. PLEASE
DO SOMETHING. MAKE PRESSURE,
TO GUARANTEE PROTECTION.”**

Syaiful Abdullah, a former leader of the FPI, a violent Islamic group.
He now works to counter extremism and intolerance. See p.45.



"This report must be required reading for all those concerned for Indonesia's future."

DR PETER CAREY

ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA; AND EMERITUS FELLOW, TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD



"Benedict Rogers has written a timely and well-researched report on what are probably the most worrying developments in post-Suharto Indonesia."

MARTIN VAN BRUINESSEN

PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF MODERN MUSLIM SOCIETIES, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES, UTRECHT UNIVERSITY



"For the last 15 years Indonesia has benefited in many ways from a more democratic political and social environment. However, there is a price to be paid for freedom. This price is seen in the rise of a number of radical Islamist groups whose very ideology undermines the democratic process. This poses a challenge for Indonesian political and social leaders, one which must be addressed urgently and effectively. CSW's report effectively identifies the challenges and the necessary responses."

DR PETER RIDDELL

VICE PRINCIPAL (ACADEMIC), MELBOURNE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

CSW is a Christian organisation working for religious freedom through advocacy and human rights, in the pursuit of justice.

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