

Overview of the Security Situation

Despite an electoral victory in 2015 bolstered by President Muhammadu Buhari's military credentials and stated aim of defeating the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency, his administration has overseen a relentless decline in security.

Resurgent terrorist factions, which are now amalgamated, continue to launch deadly attacks in the northeast. In the northwest attacks by diverse armed gangs primarily of Fulani ethnicity¹ terrorise predominantly Hausa Muslim farming communities. Attacks perpetrated by assailants alternatively termed armed Fulani herders, Fulani militants or Fulani militia are reported regularly from central states, particularly Benue, Kaduna and Plateau.² These attacks are now occurring in southern Nigeria with increased frequency.

There is a long history of disputes between nomadic herders and farming communities across the Sahel, occasioned by competition for land and water, and exacerbated by desertification and other factors. However, the asymmetry of current attacks in terms of frequency, organisation and weaponry mean these attacks now appear to constitute a campaign of ethno-religious cleansing.

CSW highlighted Nigeria's critical security vacuum in a 2020 report,³ having warned earlier that "this pivotal West African nation [was] close to failing."⁴; and in December warned again of the urgent need "to ensure protection for Nigeria's besieged citizens, and to avert the nation's descent into failed statehood." However, by May 2021, seasoned observers were concluding that Nigeria's inability to "provide peace and stability" for its citizens had converted what was a "weak state" into a failed one. "Nigeria has become a fully failed state of critical geopolitical concern. Its failure matters because the peace and prosperity of Africa and preventing the spread of disorder and militancy around the globe depend on a stronger Nigeria."⁵

Non-State Actors: Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)

Violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) have occurred for decades in northern states, bolstered by a comprehensive marginalisation of minority faith communities dating back to the colonial era. Non-Muslims in Shari'a states report being unable to enjoy rights to which they are constitutionally entitled, including difficulty or denial of access to schools, social amenities, and work in the security sector, among others, and the denial of promotions beyond a certain level.

In most Shari'a states, the construction of churches is severely restricted; most congregations cannot purchase

land for church construction, nor obtain certificates of ownership for land purchased for this purpose. For example, on 5 August a 27 year-old man named Ezekiel Bitrus Tumba was killed and six people were injured when members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) opened fire on locals as the Borno State Geographical Information System (BOGIS) demolished an Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria (EYN, Church of the Brethren in Nigeria) building in the Maduganari suburb of the Borno state capital, Maiduguri, without prior notification and despite the church possessing legitimate certificates of ownership for the land on which it was built and other relevant documentation. According to local reports, the EYN building was the fifth church to be demolished in Maiduguri by BOGIS, a body which reportedly operates under the direct supervision of the Borno state governor, Babagana Zulum. Following an outcry, the man responsible for Mr Bitrus' death was arrested. Church leaders have also asked the the governor to rebuild the church and other demolished facilities, remove the head of BOGIS and lift the ban on the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge in their primary and secondary schools.

Additionally, in many Shari'a states, and particularly in rural areas, the education of female minors from minority faith communities is frequently curtailed by abduction, forcible conversion and marriage without parental consent, undertaken by local men, often with the complicity of traditional leaders and religious institutions.

Longstanding impunity for religion-related crimes has assisted in creating an enabling environment for the emergence of extremist groups with an antipathy towards FoRB that allows for violence.⁶

Terrorist factions operating in the northeast continue to mount campaigns of murder, rape, and abduction. Both Boko Haram factions have been gaining ground since 2018, despite official proclamations of their "technical defeat" in 2015.

In May 2021 news emerged that ISWAP had overrun the original Boko Haram's Sambisa Forest headquarters, compelled Shekau to surrender, and asked him to step down. He chose to take his own life instead by detonating a suicide vest. In June ISWAP reportedly arrested 30 commanders loyal to Shekau and appointed Abu-Musaab Al Barnawi, son of Boko Haram's founder Mohammed Yusuf, to replace Shekau in Borno. The rest of Shekau's followers were given a time limit to submit to ISWAP or face the consequences.

ISWAP continued to consolidate its control over areas of Borno state in the northeast. An Interim Council has reportedly formulated policies to bring all insurgent activities in line with Islamic State (IS) practice. The Council

1 <https://www.thecable.ng/masari-bandits-arent-aliens-majority-of-them-are-fulani/amp>

2 These terms are not a condemnation of an entire people group, as some have claimed erroneously; they are used in an effort to distinguish this irregular trained and well-armed faction from law abiding Fulani communities who have lived peaceably alongside farming communities, and who are often stigmatised and, infrequently, targeted due to their shared ethnicity with these perpetrators of violence.

3 <https://www.csw.org.uk/2020/06/15/report/4689/article.htm>

4 <https://www.csw.org.uk/2020/01/30/press/4542/article.htm>

5 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/27/nigeria-is-a-failed-state/>

6 More recent incarnations include Maitatsine in the 1980s, Kata Kalo in 2009

has also established caliphates in the Lake Chad area and the Sambisa Forest, appointing an insurgent identified by local media as Abba-Kaka, the governor of Tumbumba, which includes the Marte, Abadam, Kukawa, Magumeri LGAs of Borno state and other areas in the Lake Chad region. In this capacity Abba-Kaka is reportedly mandated to work with another sect member, identified as Abubakar Dan-Buduma, as operations commander for the 'Timbuktu Triangle.' In addition, the terrorist organisation has established a judiciary with sect member Ibn Umar functioning as chief prosecutor and has created mobile courts.

The Interim Council is also reported to have lifted a ban on fishing and farming in the Lake Chad area, imposed three years ago, when it accused locals of spying for the Nigerian armed forces. An insurgent named Baba Isa to Kangar has reportedly been sent to Abadam LGA in Borno state to oversee taxation and revenue, and a tax of N2,000 (approximately GBP £3.50) per bag of fish has been imposed, among other fishing levies, while traders and farmers must pay a fee of N5,000 (approximately GBP £8.80) per month.

Non-State Actors: Militia Violence

Violence perpetrated by an irregular armed faction comprising members of Fulani ethnicity has been occurring in Plateau state since March 2010. Attacks on non-Muslim farming communities elsewhere in central Nigeria have been ongoing since 2011 but increased exponentially in 2015.⁷ In a region where ethnicity generally correlates with religion, ethnic minorities are invariably also religious minorities. Additionally, religion is either instrumentalised as a rallying point or is the *raison d'être* of armed non state actors seeking to enforce an extremist interpretation of their creed. Consequently, these attacks may constitute ethno-religious cleansing, as land is frequently occupied after its owners flee to safety.

States including Kaduna, Plateau and Benue continue to suffer from militia violence. According to the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU), in Kaduna the attacks have displaced at least 143 southern Kaduna communities. "Over 160,000 persons, mostly women and children, [are] now living under very harsh and dehumanising conditions devoid of food, medication, and other necessities of life,"⁸ because there are no official camps for tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In a deeply worrying development illustrating the firepower currently in the hands of these nonstate actors, in July Nigerian Airforce Alpha jet was downed while returning to base after a successful mission on the Zamfara-Kaduna border, but the pilot survived by ejecting, then outwitting his assailants.

On 24 August, and in a stunning breach of security, armed assailants attacked the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA),

the nation's premier military training centre in Akafa, Kaduna at around 1am, killing Lieutenant Commodore Wulah and Flight Lieutenant Okoronkwo, and kidnapping Major Christopher Datong, who is from Plateau state. The abductors later demanded a ransom of N200million (around \$450,000), refusing to reduce the sum. While initial accounts suggested Major Datong's body was found hours after his abduction, a subsequent report claimed his family and the military had received proof he is still alive.

At least 15 villages were destroyed, over 400 houses burnt down, including churches and an orphanage, around 20,000 people were displaced, and thousands of hectares of farm crops deliberately destroyed, in the spate of attacks on Bassa LGA in Plateau state. Around 36 people were killed on 24 August in an attack on Yelwan Zangam, near the University of Jos in which several victims were burnt to death in the house in which they had taken refuge. Militia men also damaged a bridge connecting Yelwan Zangam with the neighbouring Anaguta community, possibly to prevent them from assisting their neighbours.

The attack on Yelwan Zangam was the latest in an ongoing campaign of violence targeting communities belonging to predominantly Christian ethnic minority people groups in Plateau state, that claimed the lives of at least 70 Irigwe people within a fortnight. It occurred despite a curfew imposed on Jos North and Jos South Local Government Areas (LGAs) after 22 Muslim men were killed when their convoy was intercepted along the Rukuba Road area of Jos North LGA, in an act of violence that was condemned widely by both Christians and Muslims and that is currently the subject of competing narratives. One narrative describes the men as followers of the Tijaniyyah religious leader Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi, who were killed in transit to Ondo state in the south of the country. The other contends that a convoy of vehicles transporting "able-bodied men" through Jos as the mass burial of victims of earlier militia violence was due to commence, was stopped, questioned, searched, and attacked when one of the vehicles was found to be carrying weapons.

Tensions were exacerbated even further by subsequent media reports attributing the murders to "Irigwe youth," or "Christian militia," along with threats of retaliation by Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi, and a viral video by Islamic cleric Uztaz Abubakar Salihu Zaria, in which he vowed to waylay and kill Christians in northern and central states. Significantly, while the attack on Yelwan Zangam was condemned by the Plateau state chapter of the Muslim umbrella group, the Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), President Muhammadu Buhari is yet to comment on recent or previous attacks on the Irigwe community, despite immediately condoling Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi following the killings of his followers, inviting him to the presidential villa and directing security agencies to find the killers.

⁷ The increasingly well-armed militia has particularly targeted farming communities in Bauchi, Benue, southern Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states. While this violence predates the advent of the Buhari administration, its ability to increase the frequency and scope of its operations exponentially since his election in 2015 is attributed by many to the president's shared ethnicity with the perpetrators: [How Fulanis are being stigmatised in Minna IDP camps | Dailytrust](#)

⁸ <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/01/19/sokapu-bandits-displaced-160000-people-in-southern-kaduna/>

Benue, the first state to ban open grazing of cattle in 2018 following significant militia attacks, also experiences ongoing violence. On 20 March the state's governor, Samuel Ortom, narrowly escaped assassination when he was ambushed on his farm in the Tyomu community.⁹ Pointing the finger at the leadership of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) for the attack, the governor said he was marked for elimination, but would not be intimidated into restoring open grazing. While MACBAN denied involvement, the Fulani Nationality Movement, (FUNAM), which had previously asserted ownership of Nigerian land from Sokoto to the Atlantic, claimed responsibility in a press release. Stating that it acted on behalf of millions of Fulani in 15 countries, FUNAM called the governor an infidel who was attempting to destroy Fulani values and inheritance: "Wherever you are, once you are against Fulani long term interest, we shall get you down."¹⁰

Non-State Actors: Attacks in Southern Nigeria

Attacks by assailants of Fulani origin are occurring in the southwest and southeast with increasing frequency. The United States has also warned the Nigerian government of plans by al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) to penetrate Southern Nigeria.¹¹

The government's continued inaction¹² in the face of rising crime by Fulani assailants, including the destruction of farmlands, rape, and abduction for ransom, gave rise to the creation by the governors of Nigeria's six southwest states of a security force named 'Operation Amotekun' on 9 January 2020, and increased support for secession and the creation of the Oduduwa Republic.¹³

In the southeast, these unchecked violations eventually led in December 2020 to the creation of a militia named the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the regional security wing of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a secessionist organisation. Then in May, all 17 southern governors resolved to ban open grazing in their states,¹⁴ and have been enacting it successively despite threats and complaints from

MACBAN.¹⁵ Interestingly, MACBAN has less vocal on a similar ban agreed upon by northern governors,

Initially, IPOB organised peaceful pro-secessionist protests and enjoyed limited support. However, the government's excessively militarised and lethal response to these protests, ongoing detentions and enforced disappearance of Igbo men and boys, and the swift designation of the IPOB as a terrorist group merely for advocating secession triggered a steady growth in support for secession.

The government, which blames IPOB for attacks on police stations and a polling station committed by "unknown gunmen", responded by launching "Operation Restore Peace."¹⁶ In their search for IPOB supporters, security services stand accused of severe human rights violations on an alarming scale, including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, indiscriminate and arbitrary detentions, and ground and air assaults in civilian areas, as homes, student hostels, and even churches¹⁷ are raided ostensibly in a search for IPOB sympathisers.

June saw the extraordinary rendition of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, who is also a British Citizen, and who was reportedly abducted from the international airport in Kenya, tortured in a ghost house, then forcibly returned. He is currently in the custody of the DSS in Abuja. Visits by his lawyers are regularly hindered or postponed arbitrarily, and the legal team complained of having been "practically stripped naked" during a recent visit.

Similar efforts were made to secure the arrest and return of Sunday Igboho, a Yoruba activist who called for a referendum on Yoruba secession. He escaped an early morning assault on his home in which two people were murdered and 20 detained, and was arrested in the Republic of Benin at the request of the Nigerian government which is attempting to extradite him.

9 Governor Ortom described his assailants as "people who were dressed in black and from experience we now discovered that these are Fulani militias" <https://www.sbmintel.com/2021/03/daily-watch-in-ec-suspends-violent-ekiti-bye-election-fulani-group-claims-responsibility-for-attack-on-ortom/?fbclid=IwAR3YT4D2lvzbYly46TXlOPQf-2-FmPJzUJqp4xRZn6jdY0PyolKJYiuAbYc>

10 <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/05/04/samuel-ortom-when-a-governor-has-to-flee/>

11 <https://www.sbmintel.com/2021/03/daily-watch-in-ec-suspends-violent-ekiti-bye-election-fulani-group-claims-responsibility-for-attack-on-ortom/?fbclid=IwAR3YT4D2lvzbYly46TXlOPQf-2-FmPJzUJqp4xRZn6jdY0PyolKJYiuAbYc>

12 In some instances there may even be complicity. For example, in August 2020, during an attack on Apyiako village in southern Kaduna, residents who hid among maize crops saw a truck resembling an armoured military vehicle and military motorcycles drive into the village square as the attack was underway but make no effort to intervene. In March 2021, three members of the Yoruba organisation the Oodua peoples Republic (OPC) who captured notorious Fulani gang leader Iskilu Wakili whose gang abducted, raped, extorted and generally terrorised communities in the Ibarapa area of Oyo state were arrested as they attempted to hand him over to the police, and were later charged with arson and murder, which they deny: <https://tribuneonline.ng.com/wakili-released-opc-members-speak-deny-killing-anyone-committing-arson/>

13 In a recent example of militia violence in the southwest, around 20 people were killed and the traditional ruler's palace was destroyed in an attack on the Igangan community in Ibarapa North LGA, Oyo state. The violence began at 11.00pm on 5 June and continued into the early hours of 6 June. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/06/updated-gunmen-kill-20-in-igangan-in-fresh-attack/>

14 <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/462883-analysis-how-southern-governors-ban-on-open-grazing-may-reduce-farmer-herder-crisis.html>

15 <https://leadership.ng/september-1-open-grazing-ban-deadline-we-wont-recognise-your-anti-grazing-policy-miyetti-allah-tells-southern-governors/>

16 In a possible indication of impending human rights violations, when launching the initiative acting Inspector General of Police Usman Baba said the following: "Don't mind the media shout; do the job I command you. If anyone accuses you of human rights violation, the report will come to my table, and you know what I will do. So, take the battle to them wherever they are and kill them all. Don't wait for an order. What another order are you waiting for when Mr. President had ordered you to shoot anybody carrying AK-47 rifle? Quote me, even a dead policeman can be tried and dismissed from the force and his family will not get his benefits." <https://punchng.com/ig-declares-war-on-biafran-agitators-criminal-elements/>

17 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRnk850FVmk>

Non-State Actors: Kidnapping by Terrorist Factions

Both Boko Haram and ISWAP were and are responsible for the abduction and sexual enslavement of women and girls. These terrorists have been known to target both Christian and Muslim women and girls. However, there are two prominent cases: Leah Sharibu,¹⁸ the sole Christian among the 110 girls abducted from their school in Dapchi in Yobe state on 19 February 2018; and the Chibok Girls were abducted by the Shekau faction of Boko Haram in the country's first mass abduction.¹⁹

In August, two Chibok Girls, each with two children, submitted themselves to the military in Borno state at different stages, alongside Boko Haram fighters who referred to themselves euphemistically as their "husbands."²⁰ The fate of over 100 girls remains missing.

References to "marriage" in such circumstances cannot and must not be allowed to obscure the fact that young girls whose rights to freedom of religion or belief, education, parental care and liberty and security of person, among others were, and in some cases continue to be abused comprehensively, have been enslaved and violated in a manner amounting to a war crime on account of their religious belief.

Non-State Actors: Kidnapping for ransom

Kidnapping for ransom is the fastest growing criminal enterprise. While asserting, correctly, that not all kidnappers are Fulani, the Sultan of Sokoto recently acknowledged that seven or eight of every 10 arrested kidnappers are Fulani.²¹

Kaduna state is an epicentre of kidnapping and banditry activity despite being the headquarters of 11 military installations, and levels of insecurity in some areas almost match those in the northeast. According to SOKAPU in 2020 the people of southern Kaduna paid out over N900 million in ransom, with many killed after relatives of victims were unable to raise the ransom, or at times even when ransom had been paid.²² Christian leaders, their families, and congregations are particularly targeted.²³ While the state's governor asserts vociferously his decision to no longer

pay ransoms, he has not attempted to rescue victims or apprehend perpetrators.

Since 2020, there has been a particular uptick in the abduction of students across the country. One recent example is the kidnappings of around 135²⁴ students and staff from Bethel Baptist High School on 5 July. This has led the Kaduna authorities to order the closure of their school and 12 others in the area, most of which belong to Christian denominations or organisations, and which it has identified as "vulnerable". One student was released on or around 18 July on health grounds. Five children escaped on 21 July. Three others escaped and were captured by another group and released when ransom was paid. 28 students were released on 25 July upon payment of more ransom. Later, four more students escaped. On 20 August 15 more students were released in poor health following payment of more ransom. On 27 August 32 more were freed. The rest remain in custody.

There have been five school kidnappings since the Bethel Baptist Church abductions, the most recent being the abduction of 73 students and a vice-principal from the Government Day Secondary School in Kaya, a remote village in Marudun LGA, Zamfara state. Once again, the official response has been to close all schools.

Recommendations

In a [significant](#) recent television interview a long-serving and now retired military intelligence officer stated without equivocation or sentiment that religion and ethnicity are primary factors in Nigeria's current insecurity, and that the reason it is continuing and even worsening is because the government does not want to address it since its sponsors are now in key positions of governorship and government. He stated starkly that "this government does not want to solve this problem. They are escalating it because of tribal and religious sentiment."

Nigeria is failing largely due to the government's seeming unwillingness to act as decisively against militia violence as it does against protestors, dissenters and calls for secession. "[This government](#) is far from the sole cause of

18 The government negotiated the return of the other surviving girls, who were returned on 21 March 2018. However, Ms Sharibu refused to convert as a precondition for her release, and so remains in captivity. ISWAP has declared her a slave for life "based on our doctrines it is now lawful for us to do whatever we want with [her]." These words indicated that from that time onwards, Ms Sharibu would be subjected to sexual assaults. In January 2020 CSW received reports indicating Leah may have given birth. A similar report emerged in January 2021. However, both reports are impossible to corroborate definitively.

19 On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped over 276 mostly Christian girls aged between 16 and 18 from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State. The girls were sitting the West African Examination Council (WAEC) examination, and 217 of them were members of the EYN Church. At least four escaped between 2016 and 2020. One was found with a terrorist purporting to be her husband, and the other two each had a baby. Others were released following a series of negotiations, and allegedly in exchange for imprisoned key Boko Haram members and significant sums of money. Five may be suffering from Stockholm Syndrome, as they are reportedly 'become permanently embedded' in Boko Haram's 'doctrines and teaching programs', having allegedly asked not to be included in future discussions on releases.

20 <https://forbinfull.org/2021/08/11/ruth-ngladar-pogus-release-is-welcome-but-the-man-with-her-is-not-her-husband/>; <https://cswng.org.ng/press-statement-let-the-violators-of-ruth-and-hassana-face-the-full-laws-of-the-country/>

21 <https://gazettengr.com/seven-to-eight-kidnappers-arrested-are-fulani-sultan-abubakar/>

22 <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/01/19/sokapu-bandits-displaced-160000-people-in-southern-kaduna/>

23 The following are examples from 2019, 2020 and 2021 <https://www.baptistpress.com/resource-library/news/one-christian-killed-12-kidnapped-in-nigeria/>; <https://www.csw.org.uk/2021/04/26/press/5238/article.htm>; <https://dailypost.ng/2021/06/05/pastors-wives-injured-as-bandits-set-assemblies-of-gods-church-on-fire-in-kaduna/>

24 Figure given by Kaduna state police commissioner <https://thenationonline.ng.net/bandits-attack-five-schools-abduct-204-students-in-kaduna-since-january-%EF%BC%8D-cp/>

these woes. Many are rooted elsewhere, including in the legacy of past administrations, colonialism and the foreign thirst for Nigeria's resources. But the contrast between the state's weakness in many realms, and its ruthlessness in others, is stark and unforgivable." To ensure local and regional stability, sustainable development and profitable development, it is essential to restore security, assist all IDPs, avert an unnecessary additional crisis in the southeast, safeguard civic space and rebuild institutional resilience.

The British Government must urge and assist the Nigerian Government to:

1. Address every source of violence in a decisive and unbiased manner, providing sufficient protection for every vulnerable community, regardless of their religion or ethnicity.
2. Release all who are detained arbitrarily in the southeast; allow independent investigation of alleged violations, and prioritise de-escalation, reconciliation, and rehabilitation.²⁵
3. "Rebuild the policing and justice system [...] to ensure that nobody is above the law. There must be even application of the law."²⁶
4. Fully implement the Safe Schools Initiative, extending it beyond the northeast,²⁷ and be proactive in rescuing students and others who are in the hands of abductors. The future of an entire generation is at stake.
5. Respect the right to peaceful assembly and withdraw impending legislation, or amend existing laws, that impinge on press freedom or freedom of expression.
6. Formulate initiatives to tackle chronic youth unemployment.²⁸
7. Initiate restorative justice initiatives that prioritise victims, including the families of fallen soldiers,

ensuring they receive monetary and other necessary compensations.

HMG must also lead international efforts to:

8. "Ensure that people and organizations involved in electoral malpractices or any activity affecting the security of the country are sanctioned [...]. Flawed elections are, indeed, the worse form of corruption."²⁹
9. Hold Nigeria to its obligations under international and regional human rights and humanitarian law.

Finally, HMG must:

10. Extend the humanitarian assistance currently focused on the northeast to IDPs in central Nigeria, and particularly those in Kaduna state, who are neither recognised nor assisted by the authorities.

25 Boko Haram is a far greater threat to the nation, yet 600 "repentant" Boko Haram fighters had been rehabilitated under a De-radicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDR) programme by July 2020 despite high-level opposition, and a Bill was proposed in the National Assembly in 2020 to create an agency for the rehabilitation of repentant terrorists.

26 Recommendations made by Hon. Rimamnde Shawulu Kwewum, Member of the Nigerian House of Representatives for Donga/Ussa/Takum/Special Area in Taraba State, in "Understanding Nigeria's worsening security situation" republished on 31 May 2021: [Understanding Nigeria's worsening security situation | Amazing Times NG](#)

27 Both the UK and Nigeria are signatories to Safe Schools Declaration, and one of the first areas targeted for safe schools was northeast Nigeria. However, the initiative appeared to grind to a halt under the current administration. In October Nigeria will host the 4th Conference session of the Declaration in Abuja this year.

28 According to the International Labour Organization the estimated youth unemployment rate (ages 15 to 24) in Nigeria was at almost 14.2 percent in 2020. Engaging youth in gainful activity will give them a stake in society, rendering them less susceptible to extremism or criminal activity such as abduction for ransom.

29 Recommendations made by Hon. Rimamnde Shawulu Kwewum, Member of the Nigerian House of Representatives for Donga/Ussa/Takum/Special Area in Taraba State. In this article in which he also calls on the international community to "be more proactive in Nigeria. The belief that the security agencies have been compromised is increasing in Nigeria. The increased weakness of the state, amplified by the fact that no arrests and prosecution of perpetrators of violence are being undertaken, would inevitably lead to more arms flowing to groups and individuals outside the control of the state." [Understanding Nigeria's worsening security situation | Amazing Times NG](#)

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