Some people wonder how impactful the EU is in terms of encouraging human rights improvements in third countries. Being an economic superpower, trade policy is certainly one of the more powerful tools at its disposal.
For over 20 years the EU has granted trade tariff reductions to certain countries on the condition that they uphold governance related commitments, including on human rights. The Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) is currently enjoyed by 11 countries, including Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Through the GSP+ the EU is able to pose the very concrete threat of tariffs.
As an organisation, CSW very rarely calls for the imposition of tariffs on the countries we work on, since these tend to affect the general population rather than key decision makers. What we are convinced of, however, is that the process of both monitoring compliance with GSP+ commitments, and of threatening suspension of the scheme, is a relatively effective tool for human rights advocacy. For these reasons, in the cases we come short of calling for the EU to impose tariffs, we do call for the EU to maintain it as a credible threat.
2027 will see a new EU GSP regulation enter into force, and current beneficiaries will need to reapply to the scheme to continue enjoying tariff free access to the EU market.
This moment of reapplication is therefore a moment of optimal leverage, which is compounded by the fact that under the new terms applicant countries are required to produce a ‘Plan of action’ detailing the reforms they will seek, and how they will pursue them.
The EU is in the process of deciding the exact form of these plans, and CSW has been involved in consultations as to what these should look like. As part of this, we made three core points:
Firstly, that any goals set within the plans of action should be ‘SMART’: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound. This would ensure that the EU does not accept goals that are vague enough to be claimed as fulfilled without having made a real difference.
Secondly, the EU should be clear on its roadmap of monitoring compliance and associated consequences should the third country fail to meet its agreed actions. The ultimate consequence of non-compliance would be imposition of tariffs, but for the reason mentioned above intermediate actions should be made use of, such as summoning ambassadors or issuing formal notices.
Thirdly, we argued that the EU should be creative in the goals it accepts and suggests from third countries. Not all progress comes through major legislative reforms or expensive and elaborate sounding government programmes – sometimes tweaks or small steps can make an outsized difference.
To give an example of a step which would fulfil the above criteria, let us consider the issue of blasphemy in Pakistan.
It is our view that demanding that Pakistan abolishes blasphemy laws entirely, although desirable, would fail to fulfil the ‘achievable’ standard in SMART. A highly effective alternative could be to demand that the government of Pakistan leads at least one single prosecution against individuals found to have committed false accusations of blasphemy.
In 2015 the Islamabad High Court already ruled that it is a criminal offence to make a false accusation of blasphemy, and that the government should prosecute in these cases. There has also been a pattern of profiteering from false accusations of blasphemy, with recent reports exposing how gangs lure vulnerable young people into compromising situations and then use the threat of a false blasphemy accusation for blackmail.
Victims of false accusations of blasphemy are not in a position to mount a counter legal claim, given the intimidation involved in being accused, and often the inability to pay the legal fees involved. The government should therefore step in and lead these prosecutions. The collateral deterrence effect that this would have is obvious: if false accusations are prosecuted, prospective perpetrators will think twice in future.
Including a demand like this will require the EU to be creative and enterprising in its approach. For the officials who communicate and implement these demands with third countries, they will need clear political backing to fully leverage them – particularly when they are as granular as the example given here.
By CSW’s Senior EU Advocate Jonathan de Leyser
Featured Image: The Charlemagne Building by Eddy Van 3000 is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.